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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of total factor productivity (TFP) using a GB plant-
level dataset. Using a systems-GMM approach, it considers the role of the following four 
plant characteristics: internal and external knowledge; foreign ownership, multi-plant 
economies of scale and competition; and spatial spillovers and ‘place’ effects. The sample is 
disaggregated into manufacturing and services and by technology to show any differences 
across sectors. In terms of knowledge, undertaking R&D is positively associated with TFP in 
most sectors. Plant age is generally negatively related to TFP suggesting that the older 
vintages of technology embodied in the capital of older plants is outweighing any learning-
by-doing effect. Foreign ownership is positively related to TFP although there is no obvious 
TFP ranking in terms of which investing country does better, or in terms of the method by 
which FDI is undertaken. Manufacturing industries are generally found to operate under 
conditions of increasing returns-to-scale while service industries generally have decreasing 
returns. Across most sectors, single plant enterprises have higher TFP than plants belonging 
to multi-plant enterprises operating in only one region, but lower TFP than plants belonging 
to multi-plant enterprises with plants in more than one region. Industry concentration 
(proxying competition) has both positive and negative impacts on TFP across sectors. The 
agglomeration variable is generally positive and significant for services but less so in 
manufacturing. A measure of diversification is negatively related to TFP for most sectors 
although this association is only statistically significant for four out of eight sectors. This may 
suggest that congestion diseconomies are important. Plants located in cities generally perform 
better than plants in the same region outside of these cities; but with the exception of London, 
plants in the South-East have higher TFP levels. This suggests that spatial externalities 
associated with city location are not as important as the benefits of being situated in the South 
East region. 
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Productivity (and especially the productivity of both labour and capital inputs into the 
production process, i.e. total factor productivity, or TFP) is widely recognised as a key driver 
of long-run economic growth. As Paul Krugman (1997) noted “… Productivity isn’t 
everything, but in the long run it is almost everything”; and William Baumol similarly states 
that “without exaggeration in the long run probably nothing is as important for economic 
welfare as the rate of productivity growth” (Baumol, 1984). Using standard growth-
accounting methods, large-scale country and industry studies tend to confirm the importance 
of TFP and its dominance in terms of explaining differences in output growth across different 
economies (e.g., Figure 1.2, OECD, 2003; Figure 6.3, BERR, 2008; Figure 10, Mourre, 2009; 
Table 2, O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009). 
In this study we use plant level panel data for Great Britain covering 1997-2006 and 
estimate production functions for eight sub-sectors spanning marketable output in Great 
Britain. These sectors cover high-tech manufacturing; medium high-tech manufacturing; 
medium low-tech manufacturing; low tech manufacturing; high-tech knowledge intensive 
services; knowledge-intensive market services; low knowledge-intensive market services; 
and other low knowledge intensive services. Our results allow us to consider the relative 
importance (across these sub-sectors) of a wide range of determinants of TFP grouped under 
the following headings: (i) internal and external knowledge creation (as represented by 
technical progress due to undertaking R&D in the plant, and exogenous gains over time) and 
its obsolescence (as represented by the age of the plant); (ii) access to better technology 
through belonging to a foreign-owned multinational firm (‘greenfield’ versus ‘brownfield’ 
impacts for different sub-sets of countries are considered); (iii) the impact of multi-plant 
economies of scale (proxied by whether the plant is a single-plant enterprise and, if not, 
whether the firm operates in more than one UK region) and external market-based 
competition effects (as represented by the Herfindahl index of industry concentration); and 
(iv) the impact of spatial spillover and ‘place’ effects (as proxied by measures of industrial 
agglomeration and diversification, as well as the impact on productivity of being located in a 
particular region and/or city).  
This is the most comprehensive and up-to-date study of its kind for Great Britain; and 
in particular, there are significant policy implications of being able to measure more 
accurately the determinants of TFP and their relative importance. Moreover, the current UK 
Government has recently signalled its intent not to provide subsidies to firms and industries 
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but rather to concentrate on improving the overall business environment.1 The extent to 
which this may impact on the relative attractiveness of the UK as a whole for inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and/or on maintaining or increasing divergent growth rates across 
the regions of the UK, is important and we make some comments on this in the conclusions 
after presenting the results of our analysis. 
The next section sets out the modelling approach and data used to obtain estimates of 
plant level TFP for a majority of market-based sectors in the UK covering 1997-2006. The 
results are then presented in Section 3, disaggregated under the four sub-headings set out 
above. We begin each sub-section with a brief overview of the main literature in the area, 
concentrating on previous empirical results, as a prelude to presenting and discussing our 
own results. Finally, we summarise our major findings and discuss their policy implications.  
 
 
2. Data and Model estimated 
 
Plant-level panel data from the Annual Respondents Database (ARD)2 is used covering 1997-
2006 and all market-based sectors for Great Britain (although in this study we have omitted 
the following industries: those areas of agriculture, fishing and forestry covered in the ARD; 
mining & quarrying; utilities; construction, sales and motor vehicles repairs, wholesale and 
retail distribution; and financial services.3 This data is collected by the UK’s Official for 
National Statistics each year as part of the Annual Business Inquiry, designed to obtain 
statistics for calculating the national income accounts. It is available for academic use via the 
Virtual Microdata Laboratory (VML), with stringent conditions attached to it use.4 In our 
econometric analysis we weight the data using sample weights to ensure that the distribution 
of plants for which there is financial data are representative of the population of plants 
operating in each year in Great Britain. Weighting is necessary both to ensure that population 
parameters are estimated and because of the fact that one of the endogenous variables in the 
                                                 
1 On June 28th 2010 (as reported in the Financial Times), the UK Secretary for State for Business Mr Cable 
made it clear he would only give direct grants to individual companies in exceptional circumstances, focusing 
instead on creating a better climate for business through lower taxes and promoting training. 
2 For a detailed description of the ARD and discussion of several issues concerning its appropriate use, see 
Oulton (1997), Griffith (1999), and Harris (2002, 2005). Analysis using the database covers a range of areas: cf. 
Disney et. al.  (2003a,b), Harris and Drinkwater (2000), Harris (2001, 2004), Collins and Harris (2002, 2005), 
Harris and Robinson (2002, 2003, 2004a,b), Harris and Hassaszadeh (2002), Harris et. al. (2005), and Chapple 
et. al. (2005). 
3 For most of these industries we have no data on capital stocks, or they are only partially covered by the ARD. 
Others we have deliberately chosen to omit (i.e., sale and repair of motors, and the distribution sectors), mainly 
because of limitations with computer memory when using the ARD on the VML (the deliberately omitted 
industries have many hundreds of thousands of observations). 
4 More details on the VML are available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/about/who-we-are/our-services/vml/about-
the-vml/index.html.  
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model (employment) is used by the ONS as part of the stratified sampling approach to collect 
the ARD data; thus leading to the problem of endogenous sampling or stratification (see the 
appendix in Harris, 2002). 
Information on intra- and extra-mural expenditure on R&D is available in the VML 
from the Business Enterprise R&D (BERD) database on enterprises that undertake this 
activity each year. This data have been merged into the ARD using the unique enterprise 
reference codes available information in both databases, and where this information was 
missing5 we have used information on industry SIC codes and geographic postcodes to match 
respondents in the two databases. In total, based on annual data for 1997-2006 we have been 
able to successfully match in over 95% of the BERD respondents into the ARD (in terms of 
both enterprise numbers and the total spending on R&D).  
The full set of available variables, and their definitions, is set out in Table 1. Capital 
stocks were estimated at the plant level, linked to a benchmark estimate based on 1969 for 
manufacturing and 1996 for services. That is, annual 3-digit SIC real gross investment data 
dating from 1948 was used to calculate a benchmark capital stock for each industry, and this 
was then apportioned to each plant existing in the year following the benchmark year. Details 
on the methods used for manufacturing are set out in Harris and Drinkwater (2000); a similar 
approach was used for services and based on the length-of-life of plant and machinery in each 
service sector as estimated by the ONS. We also added (deflated) spending on the hire of 
plant and machinery to obtain an estimate of the total capital stock available to each plant. 
The age of the plant is obtained from whichever was oldest from either the year when 
the plant was first observed in the ARD or from information contained in the Business 
Structure Database (BSD) in the ONS. The latter is especially important for services, since 
the ARD only includes services from 1997 (data for manufacturing is available from 1970); 
however, the BSD also uses information from various service sector surveys conducted by 
the ONS (and its predecessor, the CSO) from the 1970’s and 1980’s and information is 
available from these dating back to when plants were first included. Harris et. al. (2006) 
discuss these sources; for present purposes it is important to note that for most service sector 
plants for which there is data, the earliest observation is usually in 1977. 
                                                    
5 A major problem with the BERD is that the ONS use a different system of enterprise codes for some 
respondents. 
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Single-plant status and whether the plant belonged to an enterprise operating in more 
than one region are obtained from using the enterprise group reference codes contained in the 
ARD; foreign-ownership is obtained from the ARD, and is aggregated into 3 sub-groups. 
Attempts have been made to capture two types of spillover: agglomeration economies 
associated with localisation externalities due to industrial specialisation and thus an intra-
industry phenomenon (typically called Marshall (1890), Arrow (1962), and Romer (1986), or 
MAR, externalities in the literature); and urbanisation economies (typically called Jacobian 
externalities after Jacobs, 1970 and 1986), representing diversification and therefore inter-
industry spillovers. The Herfindahl index of industrial concentration was also computed to 
take into account entry (and exit) barriers that can impact on competition, with the 
expectation of a potentially negative influence of higher concentration on productivity. In 
addition, information is available on whether the plant was located in an Assisted Area, and 
to which Government Office region, and/or city6, and industry (2-digit 1992SIC) it belonged.  
Table 2 presents the mean (weighted) values for the variables, broken-down by the 
eight sectors used in this study. The latter were chosen based mostly on Eurostat definitions 
(although with some minor amendments).7 High-tech manufacturing plants were largest (in 
terms of gross output, intermediate inputs and employment), but they were relatively younger 
(which in part explains why their capital stock was relatively small compared to other 
manufacturing sectors). In general manufacturing plants were larger than those operating in 
the service sectors, although the age of the plants in services was generally higher (see 
footnote 3 for a list of those service industries omitted from this study). Single-plant 
operations were more prevalent in manufacturing, while in services over 80% of plants 
belonged to enterprises operating plants in more than one region.  
Around 22-25% of plants in manufacturing (excluding low-tech manufacturing) were 
foreign-owned, with ‘brownfield’ plants somewhat more likely to be in operation, and overall 
EU-ownership predominating (except for high-tech manufacturing where US-ownership was 
a little more likely). Plants owned by firms from other foreign-owned countries were in the 
minority (generally across all sectors). For low-tech manufacturing and high-tech KI services, 
around 18-20% of plants were foreign-owned (EU-ownership was more likely in low-tech 
manufacturing; US-owned in high-tech KI services); ‘brownfield’ plants were generally more 
                                                    
6 The major cities we identify were either capitals (i.e., Cardiff and Edinburgh) or they met the criteria of (in 
2001) employing over 250,000 with a population density of 20+ persons per hectare; or they had employment 
over 100,000 and densities of 30+ persons per hectare.  
7 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf.  
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common than ‘greenfield’ plants. In the remaining service sectors, foreign-owned plants 
accounted for around 12-14% of all plants (Us-ownership dominating KI services and other 
low KI services; EU-owned more likely in low KI services), and again ‘brownfield’ plants 
were generally more in evidence (except for other low KI services were ‘greenfield’ US-
owned prevailed).  
The average Herfindahl index of industrial concentration was generally very low 
across all sectors;8 the highest levels of competition were in KI services, low-tech 
manufacturing, medium high-tech manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing, while 
competition was relatively low (on average) in high-tech KI services and other low KI 
services. Industry agglomeration was highest in the medium low-tech manufacturing sector 
(covering such industries as metals and shipbuilding), followed by low-tech manufacturing; it 
was lowest on average in low KI and other low KI services. Diversification was relatively 
high in KI services (covering higher-level business services), but there was little difference 
across the other sectors covered. R&D was undertaken in around 24% of high-tech 
manufacturing plants, falling to 12% in low-tech manufacturing; far fewer service sector 
plants undertook formal R&D (some 4-5% of those in high-tech KI and KI services, and less 
than 1% for the other two service sectors included). Lastly, between 16-23% of plants were 
located in Assisted Areas, where they were eligible for help from such schemes as Regional 
Selective Assistance, various R&D schemes, and EU assistance (mostly from the ERDF).     
There are several approaches to estimating TFP using micro-level panel data. Del 
Gatto et. al. (2010) and Van Beveren (2010) provide useful surveys on these different 
approaches to measuring TFP. The former point out that “… an array of methodologies is 
available, and researchers have to make a choice that, even when the estimation is only 
propaedeutical to the main analysis, it is likely to represent most of the story of an article” (p. 
2). They cover both deterministic methodologies (such as growth accounting and Data 
Envelope Analysis) and econometric approaches, splitting the latter into frontier and non-
frontier models. Del Gatto et. al. (op. cit.) also discuss the issue of macro versus micro 
estimation of TFP. The analysis here is more limited (and very similar in scope to Van 
Beveren, op. cit.) as we consider only micro-econometric approaches. This allows us to 
concentrate on those methodologies that have become the most commonly used in recent 
years, relying on micro-level (e.g. firm of plant) panel data that is much richer for analysing 
heterogeneity across enterprises and thus provides a better understanding of the causes of 
TFP differences. Growth accounting is still mainly confined to the more aggregate analysis of 
                                                 
8 Dividing these numbers into 1 gives the ‘numbers-equivalent’ of equal-sized firms on average operating in 
each sector. 
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TFP at industry or country level (e.g. analysis based on the EU KLEMS database – see 
O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009)9.  
Here we define TFP using a Cobb-Douglas log-linear production function approach 
(including fixed-effects, αi)10: 
 yit = α i + αEeit + αM mit + αK kit + αX Xit + αT t +ε it      (1) 
where endogenous y, e, m and k refer to the logarithms of real gross output, employment, 
intermediate inputs and capital stock in plant i in time t (i = 1,…, N; t=1,…T);11 and X is a 
vector of observed (proxy) variables determining TFP. In order to calculate TFP, equation (1) 
is estimated directly (e.g., Harris, et. al. 2005) providing values of the elasticities of output 
with respect to inputs (αE, αM, and αK), and then TFP is measured as the level of output that 
is not attributable to factor inputs (employment, intermediate inputs and capital) – i.e., TFP is 
due to efficiency levels and technical progress. Thus, such a measure of TFP is equivalent to: 
 ln T ˆ F Pit ≡ y it − ˆ α E eit − ˆ α M m it − ˆ α K k it = ˆ α i + ˆ α X X it + ˆ α T t + ˆ ε it    (2) 
An alternative approach, popular in the literature, is to estimate (1) without including 
Xit on the right-hand-side of the equation, and then use (2) to obtain TFP, where Xit is now 
part of the random error term ( itεˆ ). Typically, ln itPFˆT obtained from equation (2) is then 
regressed on Xit to measure the determinants of TFP as part of a two-stage approach. Clearly, 
we would expect estimates of the elasticities of output (and thus ln itPFˆT ) from this two-stage 
approach to be biased because of an omitted variable(s) problem.  
The class of models that could be (and indeed have been) used to estimate (1), using 
micro-level panel data, include: (i) simple OLS models that ignore fixed effects, endogeneity 
of inputs and outputs in the production function, and selection bias due to firm entry and exit 
(which is likely to be correlated with productivity); (ii) least squares with dummy variable 
                                                 
9 If we are mostly interested in micro-panel data analysis, then growth accounting can be problematic as reliable 
data on factor shares in costs or profits is often not available. It also usually makes certain unrealistic 
assumptions such as constant returns-to-scale and perfect competition. 
10 The inclusion of fixed effects is necessary as empirical evidence using plant- and firm-level panel data 
consistently shows that plants are heterogeneous (productivity distributions are significantly ‘spread’ out with 
large ‘tails’ of plants with low TFP) but more importantly that the distribution is persistent – plants typically 
spend long periods in the same part of the distribution. Evidence using the ARD has been presented in, for 
example, Haskel (2000) and more recently Martin (2008). Evidence from other countries is presented in Baily et 
al. (1992), Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998). Such persistence suggests that plants have ‘fixed’ characteristics 
(associated with access to different path dependent (in)tangible resources, managerial and other capabilities) that 
change little through time, and thus need to be modelled.   
11 In theory the production function should relate the flow of factor services to the flow of goods and services 
produced; in practice we rarely have data on capital and labour utilization at the micro-level, and this 
measurement error is included in εit. 
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(LSDV) models that allow for fixed-effects;12 (iii) within-group fixed effects (WG) least 
squares models that transforms the production function to remove the fixed effects but only 
controls for endogeneity and selection bias if the unobserved productivity shock is constant 
throughout time (and is therefore part of the removed fixed effect);13 (iv) 2SLS within-group 
fixed effects, allowing for endogeneity and selection bias associated with instrumented right-
hand-side variables;14,15 (v) the increasingly popular Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) approaches, and associated extensions such as Ackerberg et. al. (2006)16 
which account for both endogeneity of inputs and outputs in the production function and 
selection bias, through using two-stage procedures where unobserved TFP is ‘proxied’ by 
another state variable(s) such as investment or intermediate inputs;17 (vi) frontier models 
where the (one-sided) inefficiency term includes fixed effects but do not control for 
endogeneity and selection bias; 18 and finally our preferred approach of system-GMM, which 
includes fixed effects and tackles endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables and selection 
                                                 
12 Note, the LSDV model should be biased because of the incidental parameters problem resulting from the 
correlation of the fixed effects and the explanatory variables. However, it is possible to use the xtlsdvc routine 
available for STATA (by Bruno, 2005) which calculates bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
estimators. 
13 However, to be consistent the WG estimator assumes the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous (which 
is unlikely), or that asymptotic consistency is achieved when T → ∞ (a problem in the typical micro-panel 
where T is usually short). 
14 Note, this and all other panel estimators are concerned with fixed and not random effects (RE), as it is 
expected that the cross-sectional intercepts αi are correlated with the other right-hand-side regressors (xit). Since 
the RE model is applicable if the panel data comprise N ‘individuals’ drawn randomly from a large population 
(e.g. the typical approach in household panel studies), such that the αi are randomly distributed across cross-
sectional units, we expect the fixed effects model is more appropriate when focusing on a specific set of N firms 
which are not randomly selected from some large population. 
15 Note selection bias is controlled when an instrumental variables (IV) approach is used, because such 
instruments should remove all the correlation between productivity effects and the error term in the model. 
16 Including extensions by De Loecker (2007a); Van Biesebroeck (2005); Wooldridge (2009) and Katayama et. 
al. (2009).  
17 A thorough description of the approach is provided in Van Beveren (2010) and Del Gatto et. al. (2010). In 
essence, Olley and Pakes (OP) replace equation (1) with 
yit = β0 + βEeit + βK kit + βM mit + h(iit,kit ) +ε it     (1a) 
where TFP is proxied by h(.) – which itself is approximated by a higher-order polynomial in iit and kit –  and iit is 
investment; Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) replace equation (1) with: 
 yit = β0 + βEeit + βK kit + βM mit + h(mit,kit ) +ε it     (1b) 
Both approaches exclude fixed effects and make some other strong assumptions (as discussed in Ackerberg et. 
al., 2006) such as: (i) the firm’s optimal investment, iit (or optimal level of intermediate inputs, mit) is a strictly 
increasing function of its current productivity (the latter being assumed to evolve as a first-order Markov-
process), so only non-negative values of iit (mit) can be used; (ii) productivity is the only unobservable input 
entering the investment (intermediate inputs) function, which also rules out measurement error in these 
variables; (iii) eit is a non-dynamic input (i.e. it has no impact on future profits of the firm, thus ruling out 
training, hiring and firing costs); and (iv) kit is decided in period t – 1 (ruling out the use of hired capital assets, 
and/or incremental additions to capital, during t). In addition, there are issues over identification of βE because 
of collinearity issues (in 1a and 1b) – Wooldridge (2009) proposes a solution to this particular issue using a 
GMM approach to the OP/LP estimator where both stages of the model are estimated simultaneously.  
18 A major issue with such models is the extent to which Xit in equation (1) should be included in the 
deterministic part of the model (to set the frontier) and to what extent these variables ‘explain’ inefficiency (and 
therefore enter the model as a determinant of the one-sided inefficiency term, υit, where εit = (uit - υit) – see 
Battese and Coelli (1995). 
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bias by using their lagged values (in first differences and levels) as instruments.19 Thus 
equation (1) – in dynamic form with additional lagged values of output and factor inputs – 
was estimated using the system-GMM approach available in STATA 9.2 (Blundell and Bond, 
1998). This is sufficiently flexible to allow for both endogenous regressors20 and a first-order 
autoregressive error term. Note, as stated above, all data were also weighted to ensure that the 
samples are representative of the population of GB plants under consideration. 
While the system-GMM has certain advantages over other estimators (such as 
incorporating fixed effects, allowing for endogeneity and sample selectivity, and generally 
making fewer assumptions about the role of state variables), there continues to be an issue 
over which approach leads to least bias in estimating TFP. A number of studies have 
estimated different models using actual (non-simulated) datasets and compared the results 
obtained (e.g., Ackerberg et. al., 2006; Blundell and Bond, 1998; De Loecker, 2007b; Olley 
and Pakes, 1996; Van Beveren, 2010); but without knowing the true data generating 
processes (and hence model parameter values) underlying any particular dataset, it is not 
possible to say much more than there are differences obtained when using alternative 
approaches.21 It is our contention and experience using system-GMM and other approaches 
that the former produces results that are sensible and in accord with our a priori expectations. 
 
 
3. Plant-level results 
 
3.1 Internal and external knowledge  
 
Early approaches to understanding the micro-dynamics of productivity and growth were 
developed for understanding when firms enter markets (both as new firms and/or through 
expansion into, say, export markets), if and when they expand production, as well as their 
decision to shutdown some or all of their capacity. All these decisions depend fundamentally 
on the firm’s prospects for profits, and this in turn is dependent on its productivity and on 
whether this is above various thresholds (e.g., its shutdown threshold, defined as the lowest 
                                                 
19 The validity of the instruments (i.e., that they are correlated with endogenous regressors but are not correlated 
with the production function error term – and hence productivity) can be tested, but systems-GMM (which 
exploits more moments conditions than other GMM approaches) can still face the problem of weak instruments, 
and it is well-known by those that use the approach that the parameter estimates obtained (and the ability to pass 
diagnostic tests) is sensitive to the instrument set used. 
20 Output, intermediate inputs, labour, capital, and R&D are treated as endogenous. 
21 Even if there are prior expectations of bias in particular directions associated with particular estimators (and 
these produce relative parameter values that accord with the direction of expected bias – see Table 1 in Van 
Beveren, 2010), given the range of potential impacts on parameter estimates (endogeneity, selectivity, 
technology, demand shocks, measurement error, dynamic misspecification, etc.) it would be difficult to choose 
one estimator as ‘best’ or most reliable until more work is undertaken in this area based (optimally) on the use 
of simulated datasets.  
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level of productivity that would enable the firm to have positive discounted expected profits 
greater than its liquidation value over future periods). Such a framework leads to productivity 
and also sunk costs having a major role in explaining entry, growth and exit decisions, and 
thus the internal and external factors attached to the firm and the industry in which it operates 
that impact on productivity and sunk costs. 
Early theoretical work was particularly concerned with how productivity was related 
to size, the learning-by-doing effect associated with the age of the firm, and thus the 
likelihood of survival (cf. Jovanovic, 1982; Pakes and Ericson, 1998). Learning-by-doing 
models have been extended to include the investments of individual firms (particularly on 
intangible assets – cf. Griliches, 1981) to allow for ‘active learning’, thus relaxing the 
assumption that firm productivity levels are exogenously determined by a random draw from 
some stochastic distribution, and are thus constant over time (e.g., Ericson and Pakes, 1992; 
and Olley and Pakes, 1996). According to resource-based theories22, firms that invest in 
intangible assets, such as R&D, and consequently increase their specific internal capabilities 
and ability to absorb external knowledge, are more likely to increase their competitiveness.23 
Aw et. al. (2008) also allow firms to generate (external) knowledge through participating in 
new (e.g., export) markets, so that the evolution of firm productivity over time is determined 
by past productivity as well as investments in such knowledge acquiring activities as 
undertaking R&D (and exporting). Path-dependency is therefore an important theme of this 
type of approach; competitive advantage is dependent on accumulated firm-specific resources 
and production capabilities that have been (often slowly) developed over time and which 
cannot easily be acquired, replicated, diffused, or copied – they therefore cannot easily be 
transferred or built-up outside the firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Pavitt, 1984; David, 1985; 
Arthur, 1989; Teece and Pisano, 1998; Dosi et. al., 2000).  
Thus in estimating equation (1), we take account of internal and external knowledge 
creation (as represented by both endogenous technical progress due to undertaking R&D in 
the plant, and by exogenous gains over time) and its obsolescence (as represented by the age 
of the plant). R&D is expected to have an impact on TFP through two channels. Most 
obviously, performing R&D may generate process innovations that allow existing products to 
                                                 
22 The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm was initially put forth by Penrose (1959), and subsequently 
developed by Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991, 2001). The thrust of this viewpoint lies in the established 
assumption that ‘better’ firms possess intangible productive assets that they are able to exploit to derive 
competitive advantages. 
23 The notion of ‘absorptive capacity’ was initially put forward by Cohen and Levinthal (1990), who argued that 
the firm’s “prior related knowledge confers an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it 
and apply it to commercial ends” and “these abilities collectively constitute what we call a firm’s ‘absorptive 
capacity’ ”.  Thus, in simple terms, absorptive capacity is the firms’ ability to internalise external knowledge. 
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be produced with greater efficiency (through lower costs). It may also generate product 
innovations which will improve TFP if the new products are produced with greater efficiency 
or by using better technology than existing products (i.e., an outward shift of the firm’s 
production possibility frontier). The second channel is through the development of absorptive 
capacity (see Zahra and George, 2002, for a detailed discussion of the concept). Absorptive 
capacity permits the identification, assimilation and exploitation of innovations made by 
other firms and R&D actors, such as universities and research institutes, and is therefore also 
expected to lead to improvements in TFP. The notion of absorptive capacity is based on the 
observation that some knowledge is tacit and is difficult to acquire unless the firm is directly 
involved in R&D in the area. These two channels through which R&D may affect TFP reflect 
the two ‘faces’ of R&D.  
Theoretical models exploring the implications of the two faces of R&D are provided 
by, for example, Cohen and Levinthal (1989). Empirical evidence in support of their 
existence is provided by Griffith et al. (2004) using industry panel data for 12 OECD 
countries. However, Kneller (2005), using a similar dataset, find that while there was a 
general impact of R&D on productivity through increased innovativeness, he could only find 
evidence of an impact for R&D through the creation of absorptive capacity for smaller OECD 
countries. Similarly, Cameron et al. (2005), using a panel of UK manufacturing industries, 
did not find evidence of a role for the second face of R&D. In contrast, Lokshin et. al. (2008) 
used panel data for Dutch manufacturing firms finding that “combining internal and external 
R&D significantly contributes to productivity growth … (but) a positive impact of external 
R&D is only present in case of sufficient internal R&D in line with the absorptive capacity 
argument” (p. 400). 
Many more authors have looked for a relationship between R&D and productivity 
without distinguishing the channels through which this relationship arises. This approach is 
based upon the notion of the ‘knowledge production function’ (Griliches, 1980). Essentially, 
knowledge is treated as a factor of production, which is augmented by investment in R&D. A 
large empirical literature exists in this vein which tests whether R&D has an impact on 
productivity or productivity growth (see Wieser, 2005 for a review). For example, Wakelin 
(2001) finds that R&D intensity has a positive impact on labour productivity growth using a 
sample of 170 UK manufacturing firms. A similar paper by Kafouros (2005) finds that 
performing R&D has a positive impact on productivity growth using a dataset of 205 UK 
manufacturing firms. Maté-Garcia and Rodríguez-Fernández (2008) use Spanish firm-level 
data and find that R&D intensity leads to a statistically significant rise in the growth of labour 
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productivity. They also find that there is a stronger relationship between R&D and labour 
productivity growth in high-tech than low-tech firms. Tsai and Wang (2005), obtain the same 
result using firm-level Taiwanese data. They find a positive impact of R&D on labour 
productivity growth that was larger for high-tech firms than traditional manufacturing 
industries. Ortega-Argiles (2010), using a dataset of large European R&D investors, find 
evidence of a positive impact of R&D intensity on labour productivity, the size of which is 
smallest in low-tech firms and largest in high-tech firms. Finally, Ho et. al. (2009) found that 
R&D investment had a significant impact on TFP in Singapore, however when compared to 
OECD countries the impact was not as strong. 
The age variable is included to measure whether younger plants produce with greater 
efficiency and better technology than older plants (a vintage capital effect); or if through 
learning-by-doing productivity increases as the plant ages (e.g., Jovanovic and Nyarko, 
1996). Note, the measure of the capital stock we use here (see Harris and Drinkwater, 2000; 
Harris, 2005b) is in theory adjusted to take account of vintage effects, that occur through 
‘wear and tear’ (i.e., deterioration of capital through use) and because new capital embodies 
the latest technology (leading to obsolescence in older vintages). Thus the coefficient 
obtained on our plant age variable should be an estimate of whether older firms have higher 
TFP because ‘as plants age, managers accumulate experience, gain from learning by doing, 
undertake new investments, or achieve economies of scale, all of which can improve plant-
level productivity’ (Jensen et al., 2001). In practice though, it is unlikely that our capital stock 
estimates are fully adjusted for obsolescence,24 while additionally new plants have a relative 
advantage in adopting new technology since existing plants face sunk costs (Campbell, 
1993). According to Lambson (1991) the strength of this ‘sunk cost effect’ is likely to be 
lower in industries characterised by low sunk costs (where entering plants can choose a mix 
of new and old technologies).  
Jensen et al. (2001) find evidence that both learning and vintage effects are important 
in determining labour productivity using US firm-level data and that these two effects 
roughly offset one another so that all cohorts of firms have similar levels of productivity in a 
given year. In other words, firms that use older vintages of capital tend to have learned 
enough to offset the disadvantage at which they are placed by their older capital. In contrast, 
Salvanes and Tveteras (2004) using Norwegian manufacturing data also found that both 
effects matter, but they found “… the learning effect dominates the early years in the life of a 
                                                 
24 As Gittleman et. al. (2006) show “… the correction of productivity growth for the vintage effect requires an 
estimate of the obsolescence and depreciation parameters on the basis of age data…(then) the use of capital 
stock in efficiency units does cause some smoothing of total factor productivity growth over time” (p. 306).  
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plant and the capital vintage effect dominates in later years” (p.274). Using Dutch data, 
Brouwer et al. (2005) find that the productivity of new firms that have recently entered the 
market is lower than average but that those that survive catch up with other firms in the 
market. Once plants have survived ten years, there is little relationship between age and 
productivity. Dunne (1994), based on US manufacturing plant data, found that the use of 
advanced technology and plant age were relatively uncorrelated (and this was true for both 
low and high entry/exit industries). Power (1998) used US manufacturing panel data and also 
found little relationship between vintage effects and productivity. Others have also found 
mixed effects: a negative relationship is reported in Hill and Kalirajan (1993); positive in 
Biggs et. al. (1996); and no effect in Lundvall and Battese (2000). Although not the main 
focus of their paper, using UK data Harris & Robinson (2004a) and Harris (2010) find 
evidence of a negative relationship between age and TFP. 
A time trend is also included in equation (1) to account for (Hicks-neutral) technical 
change. This is done to capture the impact on TFP of exogenous improvements in technology 
that are common to all plants.  
A priori expectations are that the importance of all three variables will vary across 
industry categories. In particular, these variables might be expected to be more important in 
high-tech industries as these tend to be more dynamic and competitive, and will therefore 
depend to a greater extent on operating close(r) to the technological frontier. 
The results obtained for the knowledge-based variables in equation (1) are reported in 
Table 3. The impact on TFP of a plant having a non-zero R&D stock is generally positive and 
significant, except for medium low- and low-tech manufacturing where there was little 
impact. Plants in medium high-tech manufacturing benefited the most vis-à-vis other 
manufacturing plants (plants in this sector with R&D had on average 11.4% higher TFP); but 
perhaps more surprisingly, plants in services that had positive R&D stocks had the highest 
TFP gains, especially in high-tech knowledge-intensive (KI) services and other low KI 
services. However, as was shown in Table 2, relatively few plants in the service sectors had 
non-zero R&D stocks (e.g., in other low KI services only 0.2% of plants engaged in R&D); 
this suggests that the results for services in Table 3 are identifying gains achieved in 
relatively specialised plants.  
As well as considering the conditional impact of R&D on TFP (i.e., the parameter 
results reported in Table 3), Figure 1 also shows the unconditional (i.e., allowing for size, 
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ownership, age, etc. to vary) cumulative distributions of TFP for each sector, divided into 
those that had non-zero R&D stocks and those that did not; TFP was obtained from 
estimating equation (1) and then applying equation (2). A sub-group (e.g. plants with non-
zero R&D stocks in the high-tech manufacturing sector) with a productivity distribution 
always to the right of the contra sub-group (e.g. plants with zero R&D stocks in the high-tech 
manufacturing sector) is said to dominate the other sub-group. We can formally test if the 
rank ordering of productivity distribution of one sub-group of plants lies to the right of 
another sub-group using a two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic (see Stevens, 1974); 
if so, there is shown to be first-order stochastic dominance between such (random) variables, 
which is a stricter test than simply comparing average productivity levels across sub-groups. 
Figure 1 shows that in all sectors (both in manufacturing and services) plants involved in 
R&D had higher TFP when compared to those who did not; the (KS) statistics are also 
reported for each sector and all are significant at the 1% level. The value of each KS statistic 
indicates the maximum distance between each distribution; this was greatest for high-tech 
manufacturing (with a KS statistic of 0.41), high-tech KI services (test statistic of 0.53), and 
other low KI services (0.50).  
Figure 1 also shows that for those plants undertaking R&D (which dominated those 
without R&D) TFP distributions can be ranked from highest-to-lowest as follows: KI market 
services, medium low-tech manufacturing, high-tech KI services, high-tech manufacturing, 
low-tech manufacturing, other low KI services, medium high-tech manufacturing, and low KI 
market services. A priori it might be expected that TFP distributions would be ordered right-
to-left starting with high-tech manufacturing and high-tech KI services, and then working 
down the sectors in terms of their presumed technological/knowledge intensity. However, 
Figure 1 shows that medium low-tech dominates in manufacturing, above high-tech 
manufacturing, while medium high-tech manufacturing is ranked lowest in manufacturing; 
the rank ordering in services matches expectations more closely although KI market services 
dominates high-tech KI services.   
Table 3 shows that exogenous technical change was highest in high-tech 
manufacturing (at around a 4.8% p.a. increase in TFP), while other manufacturing sectors 
also experienced significant boosts from the use of new technology (on average around 2-3% 
p.a.). Gains in the service sectors were very low, and in the case of low KI services (such as 
hotels & restaurants, real estate and various labour intensive business services) technological 
progress was negative. There are few studies against which to make any comparisons; 
however, using the EU KLEMS database (O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009), average TFP over 
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1997-2006 (which might be expected to be dominated by gains from new technology rather 
than a catch-up in efficiency levels25) was 5.1%, 1.4%, 2.3%, 0.5%, and 0.7% in high-tech 
manufacturing, medium high-tech manufacturing, medium low-tech manufacturing, and 
market services respectively.26 These results, despite being based on a growth-accounting 
approach and industry-level data, are broadly in line with those reported in Table 3. The 
major exceptions are that our results (having controlled for various other impacts on TFP) are 
higher for low-tech manufacturing, and lower for the service sector.  
Lastly, we find that higher plant age is significantly related to lower TFP, especially 
in manufacturing and high-tech KI services (doubling plant age would decrease TFP by 
between 14-19%); in other service sectors the elasticity of output with respect to the age of 
the plant is less than half of the impact in manufacturing. There is some evidence that 
suggests that the strength of the relationship is indeed lower in industries where we might 
expect sunk costs to be lower, thereby lending some support to the approach put forward by 
Lambson (1991).  
When the relationship between productivity and plant age is considered using 
unconditional cumulative distributions of TFP, Figure 2 shows that older plants have higher 
TFP in every sector (although the KS statistics – all of which are significant at the 1% level – 
indicate that the difference is small for low-tech manufacturing and low KI market services). 
The difference between the conditional and unconditional results for the impact of age on 
TFP show that older plants also tend to be larger and more likely foreign-owned, and belong 
to enterprises that operate plants in more than one region (all factors that are shown below to 
be positively related to higher levels of TFP).  
 
3.2 Impact of foreign-ownership  
 
Foreign ownership dummies were also included in the model. This is justified by the 
observation that, to make it worthwhile for a foreign firm to incur the costs of setting up or 
acquiring a plant in the domestic market, foreign firms must possess characteristics that give 
them a cost advantage over domestic firms (Hymer, 1976). These characteristics may include 
specialised knowledge about production and better management or marketing capabilities, 
                                                 
25 That is, given the persistence of heterogeneity (such that plants are expected to occupy similar positions in the 
distribution of TFP for long periods of time), it might be expected that relative inefficiency levels change slowly 
and changes in the productivity distribution are more likely in short periods to be dominated by rightward shifts 
caused by technical change. 
26 The sectors were not exactly the same as that used in our study (high-tech in EU KLEMS is SIC30-33; 
medium high-tech is SIC29, 35-35; medium low-tech is SIC23-28; low-tech is SIC15-22, 36-37; and services 
comprised sectors G, H, I, SIC60-64, K and O). Note we weighted individual industry results by their share in 
GVA for each year 1997-2006 to obtain the overall TFP figures reported here. 
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both of which would lead to relatively high levels of TFP. It should be noted that, in the long-
run, some of these advantages may dissipate as domestically owned firms learn to imitate the 
foreign firms as a result of knowledge spillovers (Harris and Robinson, 2003). The speed at 
which this process occurs will be dependent upon levels of absorptive capacity in the 
domestic firms. Conversely, cultural differences between the owners of the plant and the 
workforce may act to lower levels of TFP in foreign owned plants, especially in the 
immediate period after the establishment of new ‘greenfield’ operations, or the acquisition of 
an existing plant. Dunning (1988) suggests a lack of understanding of management and 
labour attitudes as one such disadvantage possessed by foreign owned firms. It is likely that, 
in the long-run, this problem can be overcome as the owners of the plant become more 
familiar with domestic working practices. 
Furthermore, firms may undertake FDI to source technology from the host economy 
rather than to exploit superior technology from the home country (Driffield and Love, 2007). 
Plants owned by foreign owned firms that are motivated by technology sourcing rather than 
technology exploiting are likely to have lower TFP than plants owned by foreign owned that 
are technology exploiting (Fosfuri and Motta, 1999; Cantwell et al., 2004; Driffield and 
Love, 2007). However, Love (2003) was unable to find strong evidence of technology 
sourcing but does obtain strong evidence in favour of the technology exploitation hypothesis 
using data on flows of FDI into and out of the US. Similarly, Kogut and Chang (1991) use 
data on the entry of Japanese firms into the US to show that R&D intensity and the frequency 
of innovation were not statistically significant determinants of Japanese entry. This suggests 
that technology sourcing is not a strong motivation for FDI. However, Neven and Siotis 
(1996) employ a similar methodology to examine FDI inflows into the EC and do find some 
evidence that technology sourcing is a motivation for FDI. 
Foreign-owned plants may also be expected to have lower levels of TFP if foreign-
owned firms tend to keep their high value production at home and leave lower value added 
assembly operation to their foreign subsidiaries (Doms and Jensen, 1998). The latter will tend 
to employ lower-skilled workers and older technologies. This phenomenon may be especially 
problematic in peripheral regions as this is where multinationals often place low value added 
‘branch plant’ activities (Harris, 1991). 
It is therefore not clear from the literature whether foreign owned plants should be 
expected to have higher or lower TFP than domestically owned plants. The empirical 
evidence is also inconclusive. Aitken and Harrison (1999) found a 10.5% productivity 
advantage for foreign owned plants in Venezuela, and Doms and Jensen (1998) also showed, 
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using two measures of TFP, that foreign-owned plants had higher levels of TFP in the US. 
Similarly, Matthias Arnold and Javorcik (2009) found that being acquired by a foreign owned 
firm leads to a boost of 13.5% to TFP levels using Indonesian data. By contrast, Okamato 
(1999) reported that Japanese owned plants had lower TFP than domestically owned plants in 
the US automotive parts industry. For the UK, Griffith and Simpson (2003) showed that 
foreign owned manufacturing plants had much lower levels of TFP using the ARD. However, 
Harris and Robinson (2003), also using the ARD, found that foreign owned (and especially 
US-owned) plants were more productive. Criscuolo and Martin (2005) combined data from 
the Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (UKFDI) with the ARD to allow them to 
identify plants owned by UK multinationals. They show that plants owned by US 
multinationals had a TFP advantage over plants owned by UK multinationals which had 
similar levels of TFP to plants owned by non-US multinationals (all groups of multinational 
owned plants had higher TFP than domestically owned plants). Although the weight of the 
empirical evidence is on the side of a TFP advantage for foreign owned plants, there remains 
some doubt as to whether we should expect a positive or negative coefficient on the FDI 
variables. 
To make predictions about the relative TFP levels of ‘greenfield’ and ‘brownfield’ 
plants, it is helpful to consider the motives of the foreign firm when undertaking such 
investment. Greenfield investment involves the opening of a new plant while ‘brownfield’ 
investment involves the merger/acquisition of an existing plant. For firms which undertake 
FDI in order to secure access to and thereby to internalise complimentary local assets, 
‘brownfield’ investment would be the preferred form of investment. This idea is supported by 
the model of Buckley and Casson (1998) which shows that ‘brownfield’ investment will be 
preferred when the costs of learning about the domestic market are high and these costs can 
be avoided through acquisition. This implies that ‘brownfield’ plants may well have higher 
TFP than ‘greenfield’ plants which will not have access to these assets. An extension of this 
argument is that plants with better assets will be a more attractive target for foreign-owned 
firms seeking to acquire plants. If so, plants acquired through ‘brownfield’ investment will be 
a self-selected group of the population of plants. Assuming that these assets manifest 
themselves in the form of higher productivity, it is expected that multinationals tend to 
acquire plants that have high levels of TFP. Empirical evidence in support of this proposition 
is provided by Harris and Robinson (2003) and McGuckin and Nguyen (1995). 
However, there may be problems associated with ‘brownfield’ investment. For 
instance, there may be difficulties with integration of the plant into the firm and the 
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establishment of trust between owners and employees (Harris, 2009). New ‘greenfield’ 
investments may also allow foreign-owned firms to introduce modern technology and 
modern management practices, and establish their own forward and backward supply-chains 
with plants that are a closer match with their own needs and requirements. Such arguments 
suggest that ‘greenfield’ plants may have higher TFP. The limited empirical on this question 
appears to suggest that foreign-owned ‘greenfield’ plants do indeed have higher TFP than 
‘brownfield’ plants (Harris, 2009; Harris, 2010). 
In estimating equation (1), we allow for different TFP effects for plants belonging to 
US-owned, EU-owned and other foreign-owned plants, as well as whether these plants were 
‘brownfield’ or ‘greenfield’ investments. Our results are presented in Table 4. Firstly, we find 
that plants that are foreign-owned have generally higher TFP in all sectors with the exception 
of low KI market services (covering industries such as hotels & restaurants, real estate, and 
lower level and more labour intensive business services); thus only in the latter sector is there 
any evidence that multinational enterprises operating in GB were engaged in any systematic 
technology sourcing activities. For those involved in technology exploitation, (cet. par.) US-
owned plants had relatively strong TFP advantages in both high-tech manufacturing and 
high-tech KI services; while EU-owned plants had higher TFP in low-tech manufacturing, 
high-tech KI services and other low KI market services. Plants belonging to companies based 
in other foreign countries did relatively well in medium high-tech manufacturing (and 
‘greenfield’ medium low-tech manufacturing), KI market services and ‘brownfield’ other low 
KI services. Thus there is no strong evidence that US-owned plants were overall better, 
except that they tended to operate in high-tech sectors.  
As to whether ‘greenfield’ or ‘brownfield’ investment by foreign-owned companies 
resulted in higher TFP, Table 4 shows that in high-tech manufacturing ‘greenfield’ plants did 
better within the different ownership sub-groups; the opposite is largely the case for medium 
high-tech manufacturing  where current technology is generally more ‘mature’ (but note the 
evidence is less clear-cut in favour of ‘brownfield’ sites); ‘brownfield’ plants that are US- or 
EU-owned do better in high-tech KI services; ‘greenfield’ sites do on average better in KI 
market services; while in the other sectors no clear pattern emerges. Overall while we find 
evidence that foreign-owned plants operate with superior technology, it is less clear whether 
plants that were set-up as new or whether more established plants had any (cet. par.) 
productivity advantages. 
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Figures 3-5 show the unconditional cumulative distribution of TFP for various 
foreign-ownership sub-groups, compared to the TFP distributions of UK-owned plants. US-
owned plants had higher TFP for all sectors except low KI market services (thus generally 
mirroring the conditional results presented in Table 4). The largest gap between US- and UK-
owned plants was in other low KI market services (note, there were fewer US-owned plants 
in this sub-group, and Table 4 shows that when age, size and other characteristics are 
controlled for, US-owned plants had lower TFP); this was followed by high-tech KI services 
and hi- and medium low-tech manufacturing. The results for EU- and UK-owned plants 
(Figure 4) are broadly similar to the US results. However, there were some major differences 
when other foreign-owned plants are compared to UK-owned; while other FO plants in high-
tech manufacturing and high-tech KI services both dominate their UK-owned counterparts, 
the latter have TFP distributions that are generally to the right of the other FO plants in 
medium hi- and medium low-tech manufacturing, and KI market services and low KI market 
services (the effect is stronger in services vis-à-vis manufacturing).        
 
3.3 Multi-plant economies of scale and competition effects  
 
A single-plant firm dummy, equal to one if that plant is the only plant owned by the firm, is 
also included in Xit in equation (1), together with a multi-plant dummy equal to one if the 
plant belongs to an enterprise that operated in more than one region. The benchmark sub-
group is therefore multi-plant firms that operate in only a single Government Office region. 
Harris (1989) summarised the literature developed in the 1970s and 1980s on why plants 
belonging to multi-plant enterprises may have higher productivity (e.g., Scherer et. al., 1975, 
1980; Pratten, 1971; Silberston, 1972; Townroe and Roberts, 1980; Wibe, 1984). Firstly, 
multi-plant enterprises may benefit from any economies of scale (or scope) to a greater extent 
when compared to single-plant firms, especially in industries which serve a large geographic 
market and where transport costs are relatively high, since they are able to locate plants close 
to their markets. They also benefit from centralised services involving spreading risks, raising 
capital, procuring materials, supporting R&D, and engaging in sales promotion activities. In 
industries where transport costs are low but where product lines are more complex, multi-
plant enterprises may benefit from specialisation by dividing production between plants. 
Plants belonging to multi-plant enterprises will also benefit from economies of scale 
associated with the costs of carrying excess capacity if there are indivisibilities in storage 
facilities. Such plants may also benefit from marketing benefits if advertising expenditures 
need to meet a minimum threshold to be effective; this also applies to the centralisation of 
R&D facilities. Plant belonging to multi-plant enterprises may also be able to gain access to 
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cheaper sources of external funding than single-plant enterprises and lower prices for 
intermediate inputs because of bulk buying. Finally, because the ability to adopt the most 
modern technologies will be, in part, dependent upon access to information sources, single-
plant firms will be at a disadvantage compared to multi-plant firms if technology is shared 
within multi-plant enterprises (Jarmin, 1999). 
Conversely, multi-plant firms may be less efficient if they suffer from X-inefficiency 
(Leibenstein, 1966). This may be expected if principal-agent problems are more severe in 
multi-plant than single-plant enterprises. Thus the bureaucratic costs of large multi-plant 
firms (Chandler, 1962) as well as problems with incentives and information processing costs 
(Aoki, 1988) suggest that scale economies external to the plant but internal to the firm can be 
small or even negative. Furthermore, single-plant firms may be more innovative because they 
have access to a higher level of localised technical skill and knowledge than multi-plant 
firms. They are therefore more flexible in response to changes in demand (Kelley and 
Harrison, 1990). Indeed, recent literature has moved away from placing traditional economies 
of scale at the centre of whether single- or multi-plant firms should benefit most in terms of 
their productivity levels; instead more emphasis has been placed on the wider advantages of 
small versus large firms (especially as in recent decades products have become increasingly 
differentiated with shorter product cycles, implying that all firms benefit from operating 
smaller plants and thus concentrating on core competencies while outsourcing to other firms 
the production of semi-finished parts, or distribution networks, which in the 1970s and early 
1980s would have traditionally been undertaken ‘in-house’ in larger plants – Carlsson et. al., 
1994).27  
This newer literature comparing single-plant firms with larger multi-plant firms28 is 
concerned with the attributes of firms which are ‘smaller’ in terms of their organisation and 
managerial structures. Thus it is argued by Dhawan (2001) that the “… higher productivity or 
efficiency of smaller firms is the result of their leaner organizational structure that allows 
them to take strategic actions to exploit emerging market opportunities and to create a market 
niche position for themselves” (p.271). These themes of structure and niche markets are at the 
                                                 
27 Discussion of the benefits to TFP of outsourcing, as well as empirical evidence, is presented in, for example, 
Aoki (1988), Coriat (1995) and Innocenti and Labory (2004). Evidence for the UK is presented in Criscuolo and 
Leaver (2006). Olsen (2006) provides a review of this area. 
28 Note, the size of the plants operated by single- and multi-plant enterprises may be similar (due to internal – 
technical – economies of scale in production); but the size of the firm is usually larger in multi-plant enterprises. 
Plant size is taken into account when estimating equation (1) by the inclusion of factor inputs; firm size could 
have been entered directly as an additional variable but for single-plant enterprises this would have resulted in 
enterprise and plant employment being the same (and entered twice with associated potential multicollinearity 
problems). Hence we chose to include dummy variables representing whether the plant belonged to a single-
plant firm, and whether it belonged to a multi-plant firm operating in more than one region. 
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forefront of the reasons put forward in this literature as to the greater flexibility and hence 
TFP of smaller firms. Larger firms can suffer from diseconomies in managerial efficiency 
due to coordination costs and incentive difficulties (Williamson, 1967) while smaller firms 
are more responsive to change and are less risk-adverse (Utterback, 1994; Scherer, 1991; 
Audretsch, 1995). They tend to carve out niches by operating in specialised product markets, 
where quality is especially important, where they are not in direct competition with (and 
which do not require the scale of production undertaken in) large firms. Consequently small 
firms are riskier and tend to have a higher probability of closure.     
In terms of the empirical evidence, many papers have analysed whether single-plant 
enterprises have a higher or lower probability of survival. To the extent that exit is 
determined by productivity, this offers some evidence as to the productivities of single-plant 
enterprises compared to multi-plant enterprises. For example, using US data, Bernard and 
Jensen (2007), Dunne et al. (1989) and Lieberman (1990), find that plants owned by multi-
plant enterprises are more likely to close. Using UK data, Disney et al. (2003) and Harris and 
Hassaszadeh (2002) obtain similar results. However, these results are all based on controlling 
for the characteristics of the plants (especially size and age) which reduce the probability of 
shutdown; the unconditional probability of closure for single-plant firms is considerably 
higher than for plants belonging to a multi-plant enterprise. Similarly, when comparing the 
technical efficiency of SMEs and large firms in the electronics sector in Taiwan, Yang and 
Chen (2009) found that “… average technical efficiency for LEs (large enterprises) is larger 
than that of SMEs without correcting the size effect, whereas the SMEs have a higher 
technical efficiency when controlling for the endogenous choice on firm size or assuming 
them to have different production technologies” (p.377). Harris (2010) provides empirical 
evidence showing that plants owned by multi-region enterprises plants have higher levels of 
TFP than plants owned by enterprises that operate in only one region. 
The Herfindahl index is also included in equation (1), as a measure of the 
concentration of output across firms and therefore of market power (Herfindahl, 1950). Under 
the assumption that the elasticity of demand does not vary too greatly across firms in an 
industry, it is also a measure of competition within that industry (see, for example, Cabral, 
2000). Intuitively, one would expect that greater competition (which implies a lower 
Herfindahl index) will pressure firms into adopting new technologies and operating more 
efficiently. The theoretical premise of Nickell (1996) was that greater market competition 
provided firms with an incentive to reduce internal (X-) inefficiencies with a related increase 
in productivity (more intense competition brings product prices closer to marginal costs, 
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lowering rents, and this process results in higher productivity as resources and output are 
allocated to their most productive use).29 Meyer and Vickers (1997) provide a model in which 
competition allows the performance of firms to be compared with each other. Investors 
‘reward’ firms that are performing well by providing capital at lower cost. This generates 
pressure for firms to perform better than their rivals which will lead to efforts to improve 
efficiency. Greater competition also raises the elasticity of demand. This provides greater 
incentives for management to improve efficiency in order to reduce prices and realise larger 
profits. Conversely higher elasticity of demand will reduce demand from poorly performing 
firms which charge higher prices and raise the probability of bankruptcy. Again, this provides 
an incentive to use improved technology and improve their efficiency. Others have shown 
that competition is good for innovation (Arrow, 1962; Scherer, 1980; and Aghion and Howitt, 
1999). For example, Aghion and Howitt developed a theoretical model that shows that 
greater competition reduces incumbent’s pre-innovation profits more than it lowers its post 
innovation profits, thus raising innovation activities. 
However, it can also be argued – following Schumpeter (1943) and more recent 
endogenous growth theory models – that the level of competition may be inversely related to 
productivity if monopoly rents are required for management to invest in R&D which in turn 
leads to innovation and improvements in TFP (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Aghion et al., 2001; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1992 and 1999; Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). It has also 
been shown that, under some conditions, increased competition can lower the expected 
income of managers and therefore their effort (Hermalin, 1992). This reduced effort may be 
reflected in reductions in plant efficiency levels. However while the theoretical evidence is 
rather ambiguous, the recent empirical evidence available is less so.30 Nickell (1996), using 
UK data, finds that market power is negatively related to TFP levels and that competition, as 
measured by the number of competitors or the level of rents, is positively associated with 
TFP growth (see also Nickell et. al, 1997). Disney et al. (2003b), using the ARD, find that 
competition, measured as industry concentration and rents, raises the level and growth rate of 
TFP. Tang and Wang (2005) found that a firm’s perception of the level of competition it 
                                                 
29 Martin (1993) develops a model that shows the opposite; greater competition results in a smaller payoff from 
increasing marginal efficiency and therefore the less it is in the interest of the owner to put in place an incentive 
structure that induces the manager to reduce marginal cost. Spence (1984) similarly shows that as the number of 
firms in the market increases (and the expected sales of each firm decreases) then the incentive to invest in cost 
reduction falls. 
30 Studies that have supported a negative correlation between competition and productivity included Hamberg 
(1964), Mansfield (1969), Kraft (1989), Hay and Liu (1997), Porter (1998) and Symeonidis (2001). Other 
studies detect no significant relationsip – e.g., Geroski and Gugler (2004) considered the impact of the growth of 
rival firms on a firm’s employment growth using data for 14 Europan countries; while Sutton (2007) shows that 
the market shares of the first and second largest firms in Japanese industries was generally statistically 
independent of changes in the shares of other firms in the same industry. 
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faces had a positive impact on labour productivity in a sample of Canadian firms. Others that 
have found a positive relationship between competition and innovation and/or productivity 
include: Geroski (1990), Blundell et. al. (1995 and 1999), Carlin et. al. (2004), and Funakoshi 
and Motohashi (2009). Additionally, Ospina and Schiffbauer (2010) have confirmed that 
countries undergoing substantial product-market reforms designed to increase competition 
also experienced increases in productivity. More recent research has also considered the idea 
that competition-productivity affects may have an inverted U-shape. Aghion et. al. (2005) 
present a model that shows how thus might occur; Brouwer and van der Wiel (2010) 
confirmed that while greater competition in Dutch manufacturing produced higher TFP, at 
very high levels of competition this leads to a reduction in innovation expenditures and a 
lower level of TFP.
Table 5 presents the results from estimating equation (1). Firstly, we generally find 
that manufacturing benefited from increasing returns-to-scale (the exception being medium 
high-tech manufacturing), while services generally experienced decreasing returns (except 
low KI market services).31 Oulton (1996), using a modified growth-accounting approach and 
industry-level data, was not able to reject constant returns-to-scale in UK manufacturing 
industries. Using an approach based on estimating Verdoorn’s Law, Angeritz et. al. (2008, 
2009) have found increasing returns to be the norm in EU manufacturing industries. 
Moreover, others using the UK data from the ARD generally confirm that manufacturing 
enterprises operated under increasing returns (Harris, 2002; Harris and Robinson, 2004a,b; 
Harris et. al., 2005).32  
As to the impact on TFP of single-plant operations and those plants that belonged to 
enterprises that operated plants in more than one GB Government Office region (vis-à-vis the 
benchmark sub-group of multi-plant firms only operating in one region), Table 5 confirms 
that (cet. par.) both single-plant and multi-region plants had higher TFP. Generally multi-
region plants had higher levels of TFP across all sectors (from 7% higher in medium high-
tech manufacturing to 46% higher in other low KI market services), compared to single-plant 
firms (1-53% higher in the same sectors). This suggests that although there may be 
‘organisation inefficiencies’ associated with multi-plant firms, while single-plant firms are 
                                                    
31 The tests of significance reported in the table are one-sided tests against the null of constant returns-to-scale. 
Thus, strictly based on the significant results we obtained, we can still conclude that increasing returns is more 
prevalent in manufacturing vis-à-vis services.  
32 Recent estimates for US manufacturing are reported in, for example, Diewert and Fox (2008); using a cost-
function approach they find significant increasing returns in nearly all the US sectors considered. 
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able to exploit higher efficiency due to greater flexibility and operating in market niches, 
there are significant benefits in most sectors from locating plants presumably closer to major 
customers and/or suppliers. This provides support for New Economic Geography and New 
Trade Theory models where spatial productivity effects arise from plant/firm level increasing 
returns to scale and indivisibilities in production, which interact with transport costs to 
provide benefits from proximity to markets and suppliers (Fujita et. al., 1999). 
Comparing the unconditional TFP distributions of single-plant firms and multi-plant 
enterprises (Figure 6)33, the former have higher TFP throughout in all sectors except high-
tech and medium high-tech manufacturing. Part of the reason for this different result for these 
sectors (cf. Table 5) is very likely to be explained by the significantly smaller size of single-
plant high-tech and medium high-tech manufacturing plants when compared to plants 
belonging to multi-plant firms.34 Figure 7 compares the unconditional TFP distributions of 
plants belonging to multi-region firms with plants that did not belong to multi-plant firms (i.e. 
single- and multi-plant firms operating in only one region); the results for manufacturing are 
largely the opposite of those provided in Figure 6. For services, plants belonging to multi-
region firms dominated in terms of TFP in only KI market services, and again these results 
are to a large extent likely to be explained by differences in plant sizes.35  
In terms of competition effects,36 Table 5 shows that we obtain the expected negative 
relationships in medium high-tech manufacturing and low KI market services; but in low-tech 
manufacturing, high-tech KI services, and other low KI market services the more output is 
concentrated in larger firms, the lower is TFP in the sector. Given that there are several issues 
with how competition is measured (see, for example the last footnote), this is an area that 
requires further research in order to provide clearer results. 
 
                                                 
33 Note, Figure 6 does not compare single-plant enterprises with multi-plant firms operation in just one region, 
as in Table 5. Similarly, Figure 7 does not use the same benchmark as in Table 5. 
34 The average employment size of single-plant high-tech and medium high-tech manufacturing plants was 72 
and 60, respectively; the average size of multi-plants in these two sectors was 166 and 144, respectively. 
35 The average employment size of multi-region plants in high-tech KI services, KI services, low KI services 
and other low KI services was 61, 107, 29 and 18, respectively; the average size of non multi-region plants was 
102, 75, 52 and 60, respectively. 
36 Note, using competition measures such as firm-level market shares and/or price-cost margins is problematic; 
as Brouwer and van der Wiel (2010) argue increases in competition intensity can result in the reallocation of 
market shares from inefficient firms (with low mark ups) to efficient firms (with high mark ups), and thus 
increasing mark-ups are associated with more (not less) competition.  Thus our preference for the Herfindahl 
index, that includes the entire distribution of market share across firms, in the expectation that this should 
mitigate against (although perhaps not entirely alleviate) this problem. It is also interesting to note that Martin 
(2010) found a significant positive correlation between TFP and firm mark-ups (firms with higher TFP charge 
higher mark-ups), although he also found that over time that when competition increased in Chile mark-ups 
declined as productivity distributions moved to the right. 
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3.4 Spatial spillover and ‘place’ effects  
 
Spatial spillovers or agglomeration externalities are benefits that accrue to plants from being 
located in the vicinity of large concentrations of other plants. Agglomeration externalities 
take two main forms: localisation (or Marshallian) externalities, and urbanisation (or 
Jacobian) externalities. The former arise due to the concentration of plants from the same 
industry in a given area (Marshall, 1890; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986). These externalities 
may take the form of reductions in cost from being in close proximity to upstream suppliers 
of inputs and downstream purchasers of outputs due to reductions in transports costs. Cost 
reductions may also arise due to their being a large pool of labour, common pool of labour 
that has experience of working within the industry as this will reduce the costs of training. 
Finally, it may be hypothesised that knowledge spillovers may arise when firms jointly 
engage in R&D to solve common problems or as employees move between firms. This 
reflects an acknowledgement that a significant part of knowledge is tacit so that it does not 
move easily across locations due to its being embedded in individuals, firms and 
organisational systems (Gertler, 2003). This is a clear channel through which localisation 
externalities may have an impact on the technology employed in the production process and 
therefore TFP. 
By contrast, urbanisation or Jacobian externalities are benefits that accrue to plants 
from diversity in the activities of plants in a particular area (Jacobs, 1970). These benefits 
arise due to economies of scope rather than economies of scale. One explanation for the 
existence of such externalities is that a more diversified industrial base will provide access to 
a wider array of business services. This will be especially beneficial to smaller firms in 
particular, which are unable to provide these services internally (Chinitz, 1961). Urbanisation 
externalities may also take the form of knowledge spillovers which arise across industries 
because ‘the exchange of complementary knowledge across diverse firms and economic 
agents facilitates search and experimentation in innovation’ (Van Der Panne, 2004). 
Assuming this innovation leads to improvements in products or processes, it should be 
expected that such spillovers will have an impact upon TFP. Note that this conception of 
knowledge spillovers contrasts with the Marshallian view that knowledge spillovers are 
primarily an intra- rather than an inter-industry phenomenon. 
There are therefore reasons to expect both types of externalities to have an impact on 
TFP. The empirical evidence generally suggests that localisation externalities are, in terms of 
their effect on productivity, more important. Vernon Henderson (2003), using the US 
Longitudinal Research Database, finds evidence that localisation externalities have a strong 
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impact on TFP in high-tech industries but not in machinery industries. He is unable to find 
any evidence of productivity enhancing effects of urbanisation externalities. Capello (2002) 
also find evidence that localisation externalities have a positive impact on TFP using data on 
high-tech firms in the metropolitan area of Milan. The evidence for urbanisation externalities 
is far weaker. . Baldwin et. al. (2010), using Canadian plant-level data, find that productivity 
growth is positively and significantly associated with the change in variables designed to 
capture Marshallian externalities (these are the degree of labour market specialisation, the 
local density of upstream suppliers and the number of plants from the same industry within 
5km). They find a negative relationship between productivity growth and the growth in local 
population which is included as a proxy for Jacobian externalities. They suggest this latter 
result may reflect congestion diseconomies. Van Der Panne (2004), using Dutch data, 
investigates the impacts of localisation and urbanisation externalities on innovation and finds 
that the former has a positive impact on innovativeness but that the latter has no significant 
explanatory power. Assuming a link between innovation and productivity (see, for example, 
Crepon et al., 1998 for evidence in support of this assumption), this is further evidence in 
favour of the idea that Marshallian externalities have a stronger impact on productivity than 
Jacobian externalities. Graham (2009) finds evidence that both types of externality have a 
positive impact on productivity using UK data on 27 industries. A positive and statistically 
significant impact of localisation externalities is found for 13 industries while the 
corresponding figure for urbanisation externalities is 14 industries. 
In the empirical analysis below, Marshallian externalities are proxied by a variable 
measuring the proportion of industry output located within the local authority area. Jacobian 
externalities are measured by a variable calculated as the number of different SIC codes 
within the local authority area. Regional and city dummies are also included in equation (1) 
to capture the impact of being located in different regions and cities. Note this measures the 
impact of being situated in a specific region/city, having controlled for the spatial spillovers 
from which plants benefit as a result of being located in that region/city; i.e., location 
dummies do not capture the full impact of being situated in a particular region/city, just the 
TFP advantages and disadvantages over and above any benefits from spatial spillovers. 
The results are presented in Table 6; for agglomeration and diversification impacts we 
generally find that agglomeration externalities are positive in the service sectors and plants 
located in ‘clusters’ benefit from higher TFP (doubling MAR-spillovers would cet. par. 
increase TFP by around 6%). With respect to the Jacobian diversification measure, 
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urbanization economies are mostly negative, and a doubling of the proportion of industries 
present would lower TFP by 9-19% (depending on the sector). In high-tech manufacturing we 
get the opposite effect; doubling MAR-spillovers reduces TFP by on average 3%, while 
doubling Jacobian spillovers increases TFP by just over 19%. Table 6 also shows that on 
average plants located in Assisted Areas (and thus eligible for industrial assistance) had 
around 2-4% lower TFP. 
As to the regional rankings, with the South East as the benchmark region, the (cet. 
par.) impact on TFP of being located in a particular region is generally significant and 
numerically important. Regional impacts are generally in accord with expectations based on 
historical differences between the ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ regions of Great Britain. Overall, 
and based on taking a mean and median ranking across the eight sectors, plants located in the 
more rural Yorkshire-Humberside region experienced the largest negative impacts on TFP 
(e.g., around 9-13% lower in high- and low-tech manufacturing, and most service sectors); 
Wales was ranked next lowest (9-13% lower in high-tech manufacturing and most of 
services); followed by the North East (8-15% lower in services and low-tech manufacturing); 
East Midlands (7-12% lower in most of services and high- and low-tech manufacturing); 
West Midlands (10-12% lower in most of services); the North West (6-10% lower in services 
and low-tech manufacturing); and Scotland (8-20% lower in services). Other regions of 
Southern England (the South West and Eastern) did a little worse overall when compared to 
the South East (particularly in high-tech manufacturing where TFP was around 5-7% lower), 
while London performed on a par with the South East (slightly worse in medium low-tech 
manufacturing at just over 2% lower, and much better in low-tech manufacturing at 11% 
higher, with all other sectors not significantly different in terms of their impact on TFP). 
Overall regional differences were particularly marked in the service sectors, along with high- 
and low-tech manufacturing.  
As to differences based on cities, it is not possible to consider, say, positive impacts in 
isolation since there is a need to take into account simultaneously the impacts of the ‘place’ 
effects associated with the region in which the city is located. This is especially important 
with respect to Manchester; the parameter estimate on the Manchester dummy is significantly 
positive in five of the eight sectors in Table 6, but in all cases these positive impacts are 
matched by similar negative impacts associated with the North West effect. In effect, 
Manchester is not better than the South East region in any sector, and neither is it 
significantly worse, with five of the positive ‘Manchester’ estimates offset by negative ‘North 
West’ impacts. What is apparent from these results is that there is little if any TFP benefit for 
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plants located in Manchester vis-à-vis the South East, but that plants located in other areas of 
the North West (e.g., more rural areas) did have lower TFP levels than plants in the South 
East. The other city in the North West identified when estimating equation (1) is Liverpool; 
here there was a significant negative impact for low-tech manufacturing (9.2% lower) and a 
positive impact in KI market services (13% higher). However, unlike with Manchester, there 
were no sufficiently offsetting positive impacts in other sectors vis-à-vis the negative impacts 
associated with being located in the North West. Thus overall plants located in Liverpool did 
worse than if they had been located in the South East (having controlled for all the other plant 
characteristics included in equation 1), and by comparison they did worse than plants located 
in Manchester (but better than other non-city areas of the North West). 
Plants located in the Tyneside region (i.e., the cities of Newcastle and Gateshead) did 
better in five sectors when compared to the South East (manufacturing excluding high-tech, 
and KI- and low KI-market services), but significantly worse in two (high-tech 
manufacturing and other low KI services); plants in the high-tech KI services sector were 
largely on a par with plants in the South East. In general, it was being located in other areas 
of the North East which resulted in a significant negative ‘place’ effect with regard to TFP.  
With regard to cities in the West Midlands, plants located in Birmingham (cet. par.) 
did better than their counterparts in the South East in only two sectors (medium low- and 
low-tech manufacturing), and worse in the rest (in fact, the TFP impact was even lower than 
the West Midlands average in medium high-tech manufacturing and other low KI market 
services). In comparison, plants in Coventry did better than the South East in three sectors 
(medium high-tech and low-tech manufacturing, and low KI market services), and worse in 
three (high-tech manufacturing, KI- and other low-KI market services). However, in no 
sector did plants in Coventry perform on average worse than those located in the non-city 
areas of the West Midlands. Therefore in the West Midlands, it was generally beneficial to be 
located in one of the two main cities (particularly Coventry) compared to other parts of the 
region, but there was little benefit compared to TFP levels in the South East.  
In the East Midlands, Leicester had no sectors that did better than the South East, 
while six sectors did worse. In only two sectors (KI- and low KI-market services) were plants 
in Leicester able to outperform plants in the rest of the region. For Nottingham, plants 
operating in medium high- and medium low-tech manufacturing (cet. par.) had higher TFP 
than their counterparts in the South East, while plants did worse in five of the other six 
sectors. However, when compared to the rest of the East Midlands, plants in Nottingham had 
a beneficial TFP ‘place’ effect in five of the eight sectors covered. Overall in the East 
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Midlands, it was generally beneficial to be located in Nottingham (but not Leicester) 
compared to other parts of the region, but there was overall little productivity benefit from 
being located in a city when compared to the South East. 
Plants in Bristol did better than their counterparts in the South East in two sectors 
(medium low-tech manufacturing and low KI market services) and worse in four (high- and 
low-tech manufacturing, KI- and other low KI- market services). Compared to the rest of the 
South West region, plants in Bristol did better in the same two sectors in which there was an 
advantage over the South East; while they did worse in low-tech manufacturing and other KI- 
market services (in the other four sectors there was no statistically significant TFP advantage 
of being in the city vis-à-vis other areas in the South West). Overall, there appears to have 
been little overall TFP benefit from being located in Bristol, when compared to either the 
South East or the rest of the region.  
Turning to Scotland, plants in Glasgow did better than those in the South East in two 
sectors (medium low- and low-tech manufacturing) and worse in five of the remaining six. 
Compared to the rest of Scotland, Glasgow plants did better in four sectors (additionally low- 
and other low-KI market services) and worse in two (medium high-tech manufacturing and 
high-tech KI services). Plants in Edinburgh did better than those in the South East in only 
low-tech manufacturing, and worse in all the other sectors with the exception of medium low-
tech manufacturing; when compared to the average Scottish performance, plants in 
Edinburgh did better in four sectors (low-tech manufacturing, and services except KI market 
services) and worse in four (manufacturing except low-tech, and KI market services), 
indicating that overall Scotland’s capital had relatively better TFP in the service sectors. 
Thus, compared to the South East, being located in Scotland’s two major cities, and 
especially Edinburgh, generally resulted in lower TFP. Furthermore, TFP levels (cet. par.) 
were overall not especially higher when compared to non-city areas in Scotland, particularly 
for plants in Edinburgh.  
Lastly, when compared to plants located in the South East, those located in the Welsh 
capital did better in two sectors (medium hi- and medium low-tech manufacturing) and worse 
in all six of the remaining sectors. Compared to the rest of Wales, plants in Cardiff had higher 
TFP in only three sectors: medium hi- and medium low-tech manufacturing, and KI market 
services. This suggests that overall plant TFP was not significantly higher from being located 
in Cardiff (especially in services where it might be expected that the externalities from city 
location would be highest).  
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As to which of the eight sectors were more likely to have the largest positive 
externalities from city locations (vis-à-vis non-city locations), plants located in the low KI 
market services sector (e.g., hotels & restaurants, real estate, and lower level and more labour 
intensive business services), and by KI market services (more knowledge-intensive business 
services), benefited most. These results are in line with a priori expectations. Other sectors 
also benefited to a lesser extent, except for other low KI market services and high-tech 
manufacturing, where it would seem that city location resulted in few external TFP benefits 
(and in the case of high-tech manufacturing the overall effect was closer to being negative37).  
In summary the results for cities suggest that plants operating in London did as well 
as the benchmark region (the South East), but this was generally not the case for any of the 
other main GB cities identified in this study. Where cities did better it was usually in certain 
manufacturing sectors (but never high-tech manufacturing). However, there was more 
evidence that city-location within a region had a more positive impact on TFP levels, 
although less so in Leicester, Bristol, Edinburgh (with the exception of services), and Cardiff. 
These results presented so far on city location have controlled for other plant characteristics, 
as well as agglomeration and diversification economies. However, agglomeration and 
diversification economies should clearly be considered as part of the ‘place’ effect and 
therefore need to be taken account of to calculate the TFP benefits of being located in a 
particular city. Consequently, we present two further sets of results to complete the overall 
picture on whether cities are ‘better’ or not with respect to the level of TFP.  
Firstly, we have calculated the average TFP effect based on all the (underlying) 
parameter estimates reported in Table 6 (holding constant all other effects listed in Tables 3-
5), separately for plants located in each city for comparison with those plants located in (i) 
the South East; and (ii) plants located in the non-city hinterlands of the region in which a 
plant is located. That is we calculate separately s indices, one for each city, the rest of the 






















it cityregaadiversagglomPFT δβααα     (3) 
where agglom refers to the industry agglomeration variable; divers refers to diversification; 
aa refers to assisted area dummy;  reg covers each regional dummy variable; city refers to 
each city dummy variable; and αi, βi, δi are the estimated parameters in Tables A1-A8. Note 
we obtain the non-city index for each region by switching the regional dummy ‘on’ and the 
                                                 
37 For high-tech, a pooled single ‘main cities’ dummy is significantly negative, even if the results for the 
individual cities in Table 6 are generally insignificant (although often large in value). 
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city/cities dummy ‘off’. For each city, we then generate ]1)ˆˆ.[(100 −÷ SEitsit PFTPFT where SE 
refers to the South East region to generate the first set of results in Table 7; a similar formula 
replacing the South East with each relevant non-city part of the region is used to calculate the 
second set of results in the table. 
Secondly, we present in Figure 8 the unconditional TFP distribution of plants located 
in the main cities listed in Table 6 (including London) and the TFP distribution of plants 
located in other areas. The first set of results (in Table 7) therefore provide the overall impact 
of city location on TFP (conditional on size, age, ownership, scale economies, and 
competition) and therefore measures the impact of spillovers and ‘place’ effects; while Figure 
8 shows whether plants in cities did ‘better’ allowing for both plant characteristics and ‘place’ 
effects to have an impact. Considering the unconditional results first, the TFP distribution of 
plants in high-tech and medium high-tech manufacturing plants that operated in the main GB 
cities lies to the left of the distribution for plants operating elsewhere. The results for medium 
low-tech manufacturing show that city-location did not play a major role, while plants in low-
tech manufacturing located in the main cities did (marginally) better.  For services, there is 
stronger evidence that plants located in major cities did have a productivity advantage (the 
exception is other low KI market services), but to what extent this is mostly due to plant 
characteristics or a ‘place’ effect cannot be learnt from Figure 8. Hence we now turn to the 
results presented in Table 7.  
The figures in italics in Table 7 indicate where a t-test of the null hypothesis that the 
difference between average TFP in each city was significantly different to average TFP in the 
South East or the non-city part of the region in which the plant was located. As stated above, 
these average TFP indicators were based only on spatial effects (i.e. those variables in Table 
6), and were calculated using equation (3).  Table 7 also shows if the city dummy and 
relevant region dummy variable in equation (1) were jointly not significant;38 thus while there 
may be significant differences (based on equation 3) between average TFP in a city and the 
South East (or the non-city part of the region), if jointly the city and regional dummy 
variables were not significant in the model then differences in Table 7 needed to be treated as 
indicative only.  
                                                    
38 For the lower half of Table 7 (the test of city versus the rest of the region), it is only the test of whether the 
city dummy is significant that matters (not the joint test of city and relevant region dummies). 
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Based on Table 6, it was concluded that there was little if any TFP benefit for plants 
located in Manchester vis-à-vis the South East, although being located in other areas of the 
North West (e.g., more rural areas) did overall have a negative impact on TFP. Table 7 
generally provides confirmation of these results; concentrating on just those figures that are 
significant in terms of both equations (1) and (3), additionally it can be seen that Manchester 
does have a productivity ‘place’ advantage in KI market services (nearly 6% higher) and in 
other low KI market services (of some 7%) vis-à-vis the South East. It can also be seen that 
plants located in Manchester had substantial productivity advantages when compared to 
plants located in the non-city part of the North West, especially in the service sectors.  
Turning to the results for Liverpool, Table 6 showed there was a significant negative 
impact for low-tech manufacturing and a positive impact in KI market services; Table 7 
confirms the result for low-tech manufacturing (a disadvantage of nearly 14%) but also adds 
high-tech KI services as a sector where Liverpool had a significant productivity disadvantage 
(of over 20%) compared to the South East, while the positive impact in KI market services 
disappears (when agglomeration, diversification and assisted area effects are also taken into 
account). Thus we can confirm that overall plants located in Liverpool did worse than if they 
had been located in the South East, worse than plants located in Manchester, while the 
evidence is now weaker in support of the conclusion that they were better than other non-city 
areas of the North West. 
Previously we found that plants located in Tyneside did better in five sectors when 
compared to the South East but worse in two; Table 7 suggests that the city did worse in four 
sectors and better in four, although productivity advantages in low-tech manufacturing, KI 
market services, and to a lesser extent low KI market services, are small (0.4 to 4.1%). The 
disadvantages for plants in high-tech manufacturing and other low KI market services were 
also large (between 12-21% lower TFP relative to the South East) Therefore we now 
conclude that Tyneside overall had lower TFP vis-à-vis the South East; although our earlier 
assertion, that being located in other areas of the North East resulted in a significant negative 
‘place’ effect with regard to TFP, still stands (especially with regard to the service sectors).  
With regard to cities in the West Midlands, the results based on Table 6 suggested that 
it was generally beneficial to be located in one of the two main cities (particularly Coventry) 
compared to other parts of the West Midlands, but there was little benefit compared to TFP 
levels in the South East. Table 7 confirms this, but also shows more prominently the large 
productivity advantages of plants in Coventry in medium high-tech and low-tech 
manufacturing (11-25% higher when compared to the South East), while similar plants in 
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Birmingham had only a small advantage over the South East (2-4% higher). The table also 
shows that Coventry did much better than non-city parts of the region in manufacturing, 
while Birmingham did better in high-tech KI and KI market services (Coventry was better in 
low KI and other low KI market services).  
Based on Table 6, we found that Leicester had no sectors that did better than the 
South East, while six sectors did worse; in only two sectors (KI- and low KI-market services) 
were plants in Leicester able to outperform plants in the rest of the region. Table 7 confirms 
these results, providing more evidence on how poorly plants in Leicester performed (e.g., vis-
à-vis the South East, the productivity disadvantage for manufacturing and high tech KI 
services was between 9-28%). For Nottingham, Table 7 also confirms the earlier results 
showing that plants operating in medium high- and medium low-tech manufacturing (cet. 
par.) had higher TFP than their counterparts in the South East (some 8-9% higher), while 
plants did worse in five of the other six sectors (between 3-20% worse). Moreover, when 
compared to the rest of the East Midlands, with the exception of high-tech manufacturing, 
plants in Nottingham had a beneficial TFP ‘place’ effect confirming that it was generally 
beneficial to be located in Nottingham (but not Leicester) compared to other parts of the 
region, but there was overall little benefit from being located in a city when compared to TFP 
levels in the South East. 
Using the results in Table 7 allows us to soften the earlier conclusion that there 
appears to have been little overall TFP benefit from being located in Bristol, when compared 
to either the South East or particularly the rest of the region. Vis-à-vis the South East, Bristol 
did better in medium low-tech manufacturing and other low KI market services (when 
previously, when other spatial impacts were ignored, the result was worse), and only 
significantly worse in one sector (low-tech manufacturing) instead of four sectors (in addition 
to other low KI market services, Bristol is now not worse in KI market services). Also, there 
is now more evidence in Table 7 to suggest that there was a TFP advantage of being in the 
city for some sectors vis-à-vis other areas in the South West. 
Turning to Scotland, based on Table 6 we concluded that plants in Glasgow did better 
than those in the South East in two sectors (medium low- and low-tech manufacturing) and 
worse in five of the remaining six. Table 7 shows that other low KI market services now 
moves from being worse to better. In addition, when compared to other non-city areas of 
Scotland, plants in Glasgow now only do marginally worse in medium high-tech 
manufacturing (1% lower TFP). For Edinburgh, we can confirm our earlier results: plants in 
Edinburgh did better than those in the South East in only low-tech manufacturing, while 
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compared to non-city areas Scotland’s capital had relatively better TFP in low-tech 
manufacturing and most of the service sectors. Overall, the better performance of Glasgow 
vis-à-vis Edinburgh is more pronounced in Table 7.   
Lastly, Table 7 shows that when compared to plants located in the South East, those 
located in the Welsh capital did better in only one sector (11% better in medium low-tech 
manufacturing) and worse (or no better) in all of the remaining seven sectors. Compared to 
the rest of Wales, Table 7 shows that plants in Cardiff had higher TFP in four sectors: 
medium hi- and medium low-tech manufacturing, KI market services, and other low KI 
market services (the last sector is now included when taking account of agglomeration 
effects). Thus we can confirm our earlier view that overall plant TFP was not significantly 
higher than the South East, from being located in Cardiff, but that the city did do better than 
other areas of Wales.  
As to which of the eight sectors were more likely to have the largest positive 
externalities from city locations (vis-à-vis non-city locations), the results in Table 7 provide 
stronger confirmation that plants in services benefited most, while again the result for high-
tech manufacturing was overall negative. Table 7 also shows that vis-à-vis the South East, 
city locations are particularly associated with lower TFP in high-tech manufacturing and 
services. 
Based on the (conditional) results in Tables 6 and 7, as well as our (unconditional) 
results presented in Figure 8, our overall conclusion is that with the exception of London, the 
main cities of Great Britain did not have higher TFP when compared to the South East region 
(our frontier benchmark), but they did tend to have higher productivity when compared to 
their non-city hinterlands (especially with respect to TFP in services). As expected, our 
results show that not all cities do equally as well (e.g., Leicester vs. Nottingham; Liverpool 
vs. Manchester; Edinburgh vs. Glasgow), and indeed there is no overwhelming evidence 
from this study in support of British cities being the ideal locations for encouraging growth, 
particularly in high-technology industries; especially as diversification (or urbanisation) 
economies were largely negative.  
 
 
4. Summary & Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the determinants of total factor productivity (TFP) using a GB 
plant-level dataset. It has considered the role of the following four plant characteristics: 
internal and external knowledge; foreign ownership, multi-plant economies of scale and 
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competition; and spatial spillovers and ‘place’ effects. Estimates were obtained using system 
GMM as this allows for both fixed effects and endogenous regressors. The sample was 
disaggregated into manufacturing and services and by technology to show whether different 
sectors perform differently. 
In relation to the first driver of TFP, performing R&D was found to lead to higher 
TFP for all sectors with the exception of medium low-tech and low-tech manufacturing. The 
finding of a positive impact accords with a priori expectations as performing R&D should 
lead to both innovations and the development of absorptive capacity. The time trend 
(representing technical progress) was positive and significant for all sectors except low 
knowledge-intensive (KI) market services and other low KI market services. Older plants are 
found to have lower levels of TFP in all sectors with the exception of KI market services. 
This suggests that the older vintages of technology embodied in the capital of older plants is 
outweighing any learning-by-doing effect. 
In general, foreign ownership is associated with higher TFP. The low KI market 
services sector is the major exception to this rule – within this sector, ‘greenfield’ US, 
‘brownfield’ US, ‘greenfield’ other FO and ‘brownfield’ other FO plants all have lower TFP 
levels. This suggests that in low KI market services, foreign-ownership may be used to source 
knowledge whereas, in other sectors, inward FDI generally results in the exploitation of 
proprietary assets belonging to the investing firm. There is no obvious TFP ranking across 
sector in terms of which home country of the owner does better, or in terms of the method by 
which FDI is undertaken (i.e. ‘greenfield’ or ‘brownfield’). 
Turning to scale effects and competition, manufacturing industries were generally 
found to operate under conditions of increasing returns-to-scale while service industries 
generally had decreasing returns. The exceptions to this rule are medium high-tech 
manufacturing and low KI market services. Generally single plant enterprises had higher TFP 
than plants belonging to multi-plant enterprises operating in only one region. This may reflect 
X-inefficiency; however, plants belonging to multi-plant enterprises operating in more than 
one region generally had higher TFP levels than single plant enterprises. This suggests that 
economies of scale arising from membership of a multi-plant enterprise may only become 
important over a large geographical area (and where supplying nearby markets is important). 
This is of course consistent with (and provides support for) the type of models that feature in 
new economic geography and new trade theory (Fujita et. al., 1999); i.e., spatial productivity 
effects arise from firm level increasing returns to scale and indivisibilities in production 
which interact with transport costs to provide benefits from proximity to markets and 
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suppliers. Finally, plants operating in more concentrated industries had higher TFP in low-
tech manufacturing, high-tech KI services and other low KI market services. To the extent 
that concentration is a measure of competition, this is an unexpected result and may reflect 
problems with the Herfindahl index as a measure of competition. On the other hand, it may 
reflect the need for monopoly rents to encourage innovation. The negative and significant 
coefficient on this variable for the medium high-tech and low KI market services sectors 
conforms more to expectations. 
As expected, the coefficient on the agglomeration variable is positive and significant 
for three of the four service sectors. However, of the four manufacturing sectors 
agglomeration is only significantly positive for medium high-tech manufacturing. The 
diversification measure is negatively associated with TFP for most sectors although this 
association is only significant for four out of eight sectors. As suggested by Baldwin et al 
(2010) who obtain a similar result, this may suggest that congestion diseconomies are 
important. As expected, plants situated in an assisted area have lower TFP for all sectors 
(although the coefficient is not significant in high-tech manufacturing). The regional rankings 
of TFP are broadly in line with expectations, with plants in the South-East and London 
generally experiencing a productivity advantage associated with being located in these 
regions. Our results also suggest that plants located in cities generally perform better than 
plants in the same region outside of these cities; but with the exception of London, plants in 
the South-East have higher TFP levels suggesting that the spatial externalities associated with 
city location are not as important as the benefits of being situated in the South East. The 
reasons for the dominance of this region clearly deserve more research and a better (and more 
detailed) understanding.  
In terms of the long-running debate concerning whether government should attempt to 
directly improve the (knowledge) assets of firms or whether policy should aim to create a 
favourable environment for business, our results provide evidence to support both 
approaches. In terms of the former, the positive impact of performing R&D suggests support 
for policies such as R&D tax credits. The higher TFP of foreign-owned plants suggests that 
capital grants schemes such as Grants for Business Investment in England and Regional 
Selective Assistance in Scotland, which are often used to attract FDI, should have a positive 
impact on aggregate productivity. However, for these schemes to have this impact, they must 
be targeted on high-productivity FDI plants. Given their method of safeguarding and creating 
employment by assisting projects which cannot obtain funding from the private sector, there 
is concern that they may assist a poorer subset of plants and therefore not have the desired 
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impact on aggregate productivity (Harris and Robinson, 2004a and 2005; Criscuolo, et. al., 
2009; Harris, 2010). Turning to the age variables, assuming that our finding that age is 
negatively related to TFP is driven by a vintage effect, capital grants schemes, such as those 
mentioned, are also supported by our results on the grounds that such schemes allow plants to 
upgrade their vintage of technology. 
On the other hand, support can also be found from the results for policies to support 
the environment in which firms operate. For those industries with positive coefficients on the 
industry agglomeration variable, policies to encourage clusters and to facilitate collaborative 
research should be encouraged. Further research is required to enable the interpretation of the 
sometimes large differences in the coefficient on the region and city dummies as this will 
allow the development of policy to allow regions and cities to emulate the best performers. 
For now our results point to the conclusion that the South East still is the ‘place’ to be to 
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Table 1: Variable definitions used in BERD-ARD panel dataset for 1997-2006 
Variable Definitions Source 
Real gross output Plant level gross output data deflated by 2-digit ONS producer price 
(output) indices. Data are in £’000 (2000 prices) ARD 
Real intermediate inputs Plant level intermediate inputs (gross output minus GVA) deflated by 
2-digit ONS producer price (input) indices (non-manufacturing only 
has a single PPI). Data are in £’000 (2000 prices) 
ARD 
Employment Number of employees in plant. ARD 
Capital Plant & machinery capital stock (£m 1995 prices) plus real value of 
plant and machinery hires (deflated by producer price index) in plant. 
Source: Harris and Drinkwater (2000, updated).  
ARD 
Age Number of years plant has been in operation based on year of entry ARD/ 
IDBR 
Single-plant Dummy coded 1 when plant comprises a single-plant enterprise  ARD 
>1 region multiplant Dummy variable =1 if plant belongs to multiplant enterprise operating 
in more than 1 UK region ARD 
Greenfield US-owned Dummy coded 1 if US-owned and newly opened during 1997-2006 ARD 
Brownfield US-owned Dummy coded 1 if US-owned and not newly opened during 1997-
2006 ARD 
Greenfield EU-owned Dummy coded 1 if EU-owned and newly opened during 1997-2006 ARD 




Dummy coded 1 if foreign-owned by another country and newly 
opened during 1997-2006 ARD 
Brownfield Other foreign-
owned 
Dummy coded 1 if foreign-owned by another country and not newly 
opened during 1997-2006 ARD 
Herfindahl  Herfindahl index of industry concentration (3-digit level). ARD 
Industry agglomeration % of industry output (at 5-digit SIC level) located in local authority 
district in which plant is located – MAR-spillovers  ARD 
Diversification % of 5-digit industries (from over 650) located in local authority 
district in which plant is located – Jacobian spillovers ARD 
R&D undertaken* 
 
Dummy variable = 1 if plant had positive R&D stock based on 
undertaking intramural and/or extramural R&D since 1997 BERD 
Assisted Area Dummy variable = 1 if plant located in assisted area ARD 
Region Dummy variable = 1 if plant located in particular Government Office 
region ARD 
City Dummy variable = 1 plant located in major GB city (defined by 
NUTS3 code) ARD 
Industry Dummy variable = 1 depending on 1992 SIC of plant (used at 2-digit 
level). ARD 
* R&D stocks were computed using perpetual inventory method with 30% depreciation rate for the largest  
components of R&D spending (intra-mural current spending and extra-mural R&D). See Harris et. al. (2009) for 




Table 2: Mean (weighted) values 1997-2006, by sectora 
Sector Manufacturing Services 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Real gross output 22787.0 17634.2 12159.1 14773.9 9347.8 10561.8 1798.1 2028.6 
Real intermediate 
inputs 15243.4 12489.9 8173.8 9959.4 5008.5 5152.9 1023.4 1554.8 
Capital  5.9 7.3 7.0 6.0 7.0 4.4 0.5 0.3 
Employment 141 114 112 118 64 98 32 22 
Age 4.4 4.7 6.1 6.2 5.7 11.7 7.8 8.2 
Single-plant 0.245 0.254 0.121 0.105 0.030 0.097 0.022 0.025 
>1 region 
multiplant 0.513 0.524 0.702 0.654 0.800 0.801 0.849 0.823 
Greenfield US-
owned 0.040 0.046 0.024 0.029 0.040 0.015 0.010 0.066 
Brownfield US-
owned 0.049 0.053 0.036 0.037 0.067 0.053 0.042 0.037 
Greenfield EU-
owned 0.042 0.049 0.047 0.033 0.017 0.011 0.037 0.002 
Brownfield EU-
owned 0.042 0.060 0.090 0.043 0.041 0.035 0.040 0.009 
Greenfield Other 
foreign-owned 0.022 0.021 0.016 0.015 0.007 0.003 0.002 0.001 
Brownfield Other 
foreign-owned 0.024 0.018 0.019 0.027 0.024 0.012 0.008 0.002 
Herfindahl  0.023 0.018 0.028 0.015 0.083 0.011 0.026 0.064 
Industry 
agglomeration 1.00 1.40 3.26 2.35 0.83 1.78 0.60 0.65 
Diversification 52.3 54.6 57.5 55.5 53.9 70.2 58.9 57.5 
R&D undertaken 0.242 0.206 0.171 0.117 0.048 0.035 0.002 0.002 
Assisted Area 0.196 0.228 0.205 0.200 0.156 0.174 0.165 0.171 
a (1) High-tech: Pharmaceuticals (SIC244); Office machinery & computers (SIC30); Radio, TV & 
communications equipment (SIC32); Medical & precision instruments (SIC33); Aircraft & spacecraft (SIC353);  
(2) Medium high-tech: Chemicals (SIC24 exc. Pharmaceuticals, SIC244); Machinery & equipment (SIC29); 
Electrical machinery (SIC31); Motor vehicles (SIC34); Other transport equipment (SIC 35 exc. Ships & boats, 
SIC351, and Aircraft & spacecraft, SIC353);  
(3) Medium low-tech: Coke & petroleum (SIC23); Rubber & plastics (SIC25); Other non-metallic (SIC26); 
Basic metals (SIC 27); Fabricated metals (SIC28); Ships & boats (SIC351);  
(4) Low-tech: Food & beverages (SIC15); Tobacco (SIC16); Textiles (SIC17); Clothing (SIC18); Leather goods 
(SIC 19); Wood products (SIC 20);  Paper products (SIC21); Publishing, printing (SIC22); Furniture and other 
manufacturing (SIC36); recycling (SIC37);  
(5) High-tech KI: Telecoms (SIC642); Computer & related (SIC72 exc. Maintenance & repair, SIC725); R&D 
(SIC73); Photographic activities (SIC7481); Motion pictures (SIC 921); Radio & TV activities (SIC922); 
Artistic & literary creation (SIC9231);  
(6) KI services: Water transport (SIC61); Air transport (SIC62); Legal, accountancy & consultancy (SIC741 
exc. Management activities of holding companies, SIC7415); Architecture & engineering (SIC742); Technical 
testing (SIC 743); Advertising (SIC744);  
(7) Low KI: Hotels & restaurants (SIC55); Land transport (SIC60); Support for transport (SIC63); real estate 
(SIC70); Renting machinery (SIC 71); Maintenance & repair of office machines (SIC725); Management 
activities of holding companies (SIC7415);  Labour recruitment (SIC745); Investigation services (SIC746); 
Industrial cleaning (SIC747); Packaging (SIC7482); Secretarial services (SIC7483); Other business services 
(SIC7484); Sewage & refuse (SIC90);  
(8) Other low KI: Postal services (SIC641); Membership organisations (SIC91); Other entertainment services 
(SIC923 exc. Artistic & literary creation, SIC9231); News agencies (SIC924); Sporting activities (SIC926); 
Other recreational activities (SIC927); Other services (SIC93). 
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Table 3: Increase in TFP due to Knowledge-based Determinants, 1997-2006, Great Britain 
 R&D undertakenta t ln aget 
High-tech manufacturing 0.042 0.048 -0.187 
Medium high-tech manufacturing 0.114 0.019 -0.184 
Medium low-tech manufacturing 0.001 0.023 -0.140 
Low-tech manufacturing 0.006 0.023 -0.154 
High-tech KI services 0.252 0.006 -0.173 
KI market services 0.127 0.005 -0.042 
Low KI market services 0.165 -0.004 -0.062 
Other low KI market services 0.564 0.000 -0.070 
a Parameter values for dummy variables are converted using exp(x) − 1.  



























Other low KI 
market 
services 
Greenfield US-ownedt 0.179 0.043 0.024 0.124 0.214 0.099 -0.069 0.043 
Brownfield US-ownedt 0.130 0.125 0.034 0.080 0.428 0.045 -0.088 -0.141 
Greenfield EU-ownedt 0.112 0.080 0.068 0.179 0.191 0.172 0.069 0.120 
Brownfield EU-ownedt 0.088 0.104 0.043 0.225 0.201 0.008 -0.049 0.124 
Greenfield Other FOt 0.140 0.133 0.358 0.016 0.362 0.190 -0.169 -0.032 
Brownfield Other FOt 0.083 0.125 -0.024 0.026 -0.033 0.221 -0.117 0.196 
a Parameter values for dummy variables are converted using exp(x) − 1.  
Figures in italics not significant at 10% level.             Source: Tables A1-A8 
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>1 regiont ln Herfindahlt
High-tech manufacturing 1.056 0.080 0.093 0.015 
Medium high-tech 
manufacturing 0.856 0.013 0.070 -0.025 
Medium low-tech 
manufacturing 1.015 0.083 0.127 0.021 
Low-tech manufacturing 1.024 0.123 0.143 0.034 
High-tech KI services 0.946 0.021 -0.128 0.092 
KI market services 0.927 0.111 0.235 -0.007 
Low KI market services 1.023 -0.023 -0.032 -0.099 
Other low KI market 
services 0.949 0.530 0.459 0.012 
a Parameter values for dummy variables are converted using exp(x) − 1.  























Other low KI 
market 
services 
ln Industry agglomerationt -0.034 0.065 -0.036 -0.005 0.058 0.068 0.003 0.056 
ln Diversificationt 0.193 -0.094 -0.185 0.035 -0.167 -0.168 0.002 -0.004 
Located in Assisted Areat -0.010 -0.025 -0.026 -0.046 -0.030 -0.034 -0.013 0.050 
North Eastt -0.051 -0.024 -0.042 -0.091 -0.155 -0.134 -0.081 -0.082 
Yorks-Humbersidet -0.092 -0.050 0.067 -0.130 -0.119 -0.105 -0.088 -0.129 
North Westt -0.053 -0.048 0.049 -0.065 -0.094 -0.102 -0.085 -0.064 
West Midlandst -0.070 -0.043 -0.003 -0.044 -0.106 -0.101 -0.037 -0.122 
East Midlandst -0.108 -0.030 -0.010 -0.100 -0.115 -0.118 -0.074 -0.050 
South Westt -0.068 -0.010 0.022 -0.005 -0.012 -0.027 0.000 -0.041 
Easternt -0.050 0.018 -0.014 0.000 -0.021 -0.016 -0.026 -0.049 
Londont 0.025 0.003 -0.023 0.108 -0.007 0.008 -0.001 -0.015 
Scotlandt 0.019 -0.031 0.080 0.006 -0.196 -0.080 -0.134 -0.176 
Walest -0.092 -0.054 0.022 -0.054 -0.133 -0.113 -0.103 -0.046 
Tynesidet -0.128 0.095 0.078 0.155 0.154 0.171 0.145 -0.164 
Manchestert 0.014 0.042 0.040 0.078 0.021 0.108 0.091 0.023 
Liverpoolt 0.083 0.031 -0.050 -0.092 0.031 0.126 0.005 -0.032 
Birminghamt -0.034 -0.020 0.064 0.104 0.036 0.060 0.001 -0.064 
Coventryt 0.046 0.090 0.079 0.398 0.090 0.023 0.060 0.068 
Leicestert -0.171 -0.156 -0.051 -0.059 -0.156 0.132 0.069 -0.021 
Nottinghamt -0.154 0.111 0.114 0.052 0.111 0.050 0.049 0.007 
Bristolt -0.015 0.009 0.122 -0.039 0.030 -0.019 0.147 -0.021 
Glasgowt 0.026 -0.018 0.107 0.077 -0.036 0.012 0.057 0.093 
Edinburght -0.106 -0.046 -0.064 0.111 0.046 -0.083 0.026 0.066 
Cardifft -0.091 0.077 0.113 -0.002 -0.086 0.049 -0.023 -0.041 
a Parameter values for dummy variables are converted using exp(x) − 1.  
Figures in italics not significant at 10% level.             Source: Tables A1-A8
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Table 7: Relative mean TFP in Main Cities, 1997-2006, Great Britain (figures are percentages) 





















Londont 6.2a -2.4a -2.3 8.3 3.0a 10.0a 0.3a 7.6a 
Tynesidet -12.1 8.0 -4.6 0.4 -5.0 0.6 4.1 -20.7 
Manchestert 1.3a 0.7 2.1a 0.9 -4.2a 5.7 0.5 7.5 
Liverpoolt 3.8a -3.3 * -13.8 -20.1 0.2 -8.9a 9.5a 
Birminghamt -6.7a 1.8 -9.1 4.0 -5.0 0.1 -3.4a -7.4 
Coventryt -3.3a 10.8 0.6a 25.4 -16.0 -9.7a 1.9 -0.3a 
Leicestert -21.3 -13.3 -9.3 -12.2 -27.6 -0.3 -0.8 -1.7a 
Nottinghamt -19.8 8.7 8.3 -4.2 -7.0 -4.6 -2.6 5.5a 
Bristolt -4.0a 0.0a 9.0 -3.1 2.9a 0.0a 15.2 1.3 
Glasgowt 8.9a -6.2 11.2 3.0 -21.3 -3.8 -9.3 10.7 
Edinburght -6.7 -8.8 -0.5 9.2 -12.9 -9.4 -11.0 -5.1 
Cardifft -14.6a -0.7 11.4 -4.6a -18.1 -4.7 -12.8 -1.1 
(ii) City − rest of region         
Tynesidet -6.8 8.1 0.3 11.7 18.7 19.4 14.6 -16.0 
Manchestert 4.9b 4.0 1.7a 8.0 10.2b 20.4 10.5 11.1 
Liverpoolt 7.5b -0.1 * -7.8 -8.1 14.0 0.1b 13.2b 
Birminghamt -1.6b 2.7 -1.8 8.0 9.3 13.8 0.6b 9.3 
Coventryt 2.1b 11.8 8.6b 30.3 -3.3 2.7b 6.1 17.6 
Leicestert -14.1 -12.1 -6.1 -4.4 -13.4 16.2 7.5 6.8b 
Nottinghamt -12.5 10.3 12.2 4.3b 11.2 11.1 5.5 14.6b 
Bristolt 2.1b 0.8b 7.7 -2.5 8.8b 6.2b 15.3 8.8 
Glasgowt 8.1b -1.4 5.2 4.9 1.3 6.1b 5.6 34.4 
Edinburght -7.4 -4.2 -5.9 11.2 12.2 0.0 3.7 15.2 
Cardifft -6.3b 3.1 9.1 0.2b 0.2 12.3 -2.2 5.9 
* suppressed to maintain confidentiality.    
a A test that city and relevant region dummies in Table 6 are jointly zero could not be rejected at 10% level  
b City-dummies were not significant in Table 6.             
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Figure 1: TFP distribution for plants with non-zero/zero R&D stocks, 1997-2006 
 



















Figure 2: TFP distribution for plants aged 5+ years and aged less than 5 years, 1997-2006 
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Figure 3: TFP distribution for US- and UK-owned plants, 1997-2006 
 



















Figure 4: TFP distribution for EU- and UK-owned plants, 1997-2006 
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Figure 5: TFP distribution for Other foreign- and UK-owned plants, 1997-2006 
 


















Figure 6: TFP distribution for single-plant/multi-plant enterprises, 1997-2006 
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Figure 7: TFP distribution for multi-region/not multi-region enterprises, 1997-2006 
 


















Figure 8: TFP distribution for main cities (including London) and the rest of GB, 1997-2006 
 










Table A.1: Long-run weighted systems GMM production function, high-tech sectora, 1997-2006 
Dependent variable: ln gross outputt βˆ  z-statistic βˆ  z-statistic 
ln intermediate inputst 0.435*** 5.14 0.438*** 5.15 
ln employmentt 0.429*** 4.43 0.427*** 4.43 
ln capitalt 0.195*** 3.41 0.191*** 3.37 
t 0.049*** 8.69 0.048*** 8.59 
ln aget -0.191*** -3.61 -0.187*** -3.56 
Single-plant enterpriset 0.077*** 3.71 0.077*** 3.79 
Enterprise operates in >1 regiont 0.088*** 2.97 0.089*** 2.98 
Greenfield US-ownedt 0.164*** 3.08 0.165*** 3.13 
Brownfield US-ownedt 0.124*** 2.97 0.122*** 2.93 
Greenfield EU-ownedt 0.112** 2.17 0.106** 2.07 
Brownfield EU-ownedt 0.086* 1.73 0.084* 1.69 
Greenfield Other FOt 0.132* 1.64 0.131* 1.64 
Brownfield Other FOt 0.081 1.25 0.080 1.24 
ln Industry agglomerationt -0.036* -1.68 -0.034 -1.59 
ln Diversificationt 0.157** 2.23 0.193** 2.23 
ln Herfindahlt 0.016 1.55 0.015 1.45 
R&D undertakent 0.041** 2.18 0.041** 2.20 
Located in Assisted Areat 0.002 0.09 -0.010 -0.49 
North Eastt -0.096*** -2.65 -0.052*** -1.31 
Yorks-Humbersidet -0.089*** -2.67 -0.097*** -2.86 
North Westt -0.054 -1.50 -0.054 -1.47 
West Midlandst -0.075*** -2.84 -0.073*** -2.67 
East Midlandst -0.142*** -4.10 -0.114*** -3.39 
South Westt -0.072*** -2.92 -0.070*** -2.80 
Easternt -0.051** -2.28 -0.051** -2.32 
Londont 0.029 0.96 0.025 0.83 
Scotlandt 0.005 0.17 0.019 0.58 
Walest -0.112*** -3.50 -0.096*** -3.09 
Tynesidet − − -0.137* -1.78 
Manchestert − − 0.014 0.18 
Liverpoolt − − 0.080 1.19 
Birminghamt − − -0.035 -0.62 
Coventryt − − 0.045 0.79 
Leicestert − − -0.187 -2.45 
Nottinghamt − − -0.167 -1.05 
Bristolt − − -0.015 -0.22 
Glasgowt − − 0.026 0.41 
Edinburght − − -0.112* -1.64 
Cardifft − − -0.095 -1.00 
     
Industry dummies yes  yes  
AR(1) z-statistic -6.71***  -6.71***  
AR(2) z-statistic 1.19  1.19  
Hansen test χ2 (df) 27.60 (23)  27.60 (23)  
No. of Obs. 12,906  12,906  
No. of groups 5,386  5,386  
a See Table 2 for definition 




Table A.2: Long-run weighted systems GMM production function, medium high-tech sectora, 1997-
2006 
Dependent variable: ln gross outputt βˆ  z-statistic βˆ  z-statistic 
ln intermediate inputst 0.375*** 6.12 0.377*** 6.15 
ln employmentt 0.192*** 3.93 0.192*** 3.93 
ln capitalt 0.289*** 10.95 0.287*** 10.73 
t 0.019*** 15.06 0.019*** 15.51 
ln aget -0.184*** -11.92 -0.184*** -11.69 
Single-plant enterpriset 0.014* 1.83 0.013* 1.69 
Enterprise operates in >1 regiont 0.070*** 4.76 0.068*** 4.63 
Greenfield US-ownedt 0.043* 1.86 0.042* 1.84 
Brownfield US-ownedt 0.122*** 4.17 0.118*** 4.08 
Greenfield EU-ownedt 0.079*** 4.18 0.077*** 4.13 
Brownfield EU-ownedt 0.098*** 5.72 0.099*** 5.71 
Greenfield Other FOt 0.126*** 4.42 0.125*** 4.39 
Brownfield Other FOt 0.120*** 5.45 0.118*** 5.38 
ln Industry agglomerationt 0.065*** 7.77 0.065*** 7.57 
ln Diversificationt -0.092*** -5.92 -0.094*** -6.22 
ln Herfindahlt -0.025*** -6.53 -0.025*** -6.64 
R&D undertakent 0.109*** 4.49 0.108*** 4.42 
Located in Assisted Areat -0.024*** -7.26 -0.025*** -7.34 
North Eastt -0.005 -0.89 -0.024*** -3.86 
Yorks-Humbersidet -0.052*** -11.12 -0.051*** -10.02 
North Westt -0.047*** -10.60 -0.049*** -10.45 
West Midlandst -0.043*** -7.81 -0.044*** -8.03 
East Midlandst -0.038*** -5.49 -0.030*** -4.79 
South Westt -0.009 -1.46 -0.010 -1.49 
Easternt 0.018*** 4.04 0.018*** 4.03 
Londont 0.002 0.33 0.003 0.48 
Scotlandt -0.036*** -7.34 -0.031*** -6.13 
Walest -0.050*** -7.49 -0.056*** -8.56 
Tynesidet − − 0.091*** 7.50 
Manchestert − − 0.041*** 3.44 
Liverpoolt − − 0.031** 2.19 
Birminghamt − − -0.020** -1.99 
Coventryt − − 0.086*** 5.92 
Leicestert − − -0.170*** -8.03 
Nottinghamt − − 0.105*** 6.81 
Bristolt − − 0.009 0.81 
Glasgowt − − -0.018* -1.81 
Edinburght − − -0.047*** -3.16 
Cardifft − − 0.074*** 5.11 
     
Industry dummies yes  yes  
AR(1) z-statistic -27.05***  -26.76***  
AR(2) z-statistic -0.95  -0.99  
Hansen test χ2 (df) 22.22 (15)  22.41 (15)  
No. of Obs. 40,834  40,834  
No. of groups 15,957  15,957  
a See Table 2 for definition 
 ***/**/* significant at 1%/5%/10% level.  
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Table A.3: Long-run weighted systems GMM production function, medium low-tech sectora, 1997-
2006 
Dependent variable: ln gross outputt βˆ  z-statistic βˆ  z-statistic 
ln intermediate inputst 0.387** 2.03 0.451*** 2.64 
ln employmentt 0.466*** 2.75 0.423*** 2.76 
ln capitalt 0.160*** 3.78 0.141*** 3.97 
t 0.024*** 4.34 0.023*** 4.59 
ln aget -0.155*** -4.42 -0.140*** -4.74 
Single-plant enterpriset 0.086*** 4.09 0.080*** 4.41 
Enterprise operates in >1 regiont 0.146* 1.79 0.120* 1.64 
Greenfield US-ownedt 0.032 0.65 0.024 0.56 
Brownfield US-ownedt 0.033 1.12 0.033 1.22 
Greenfield EU-ownedt 0.084 1.04 0.066 0.91 
Brownfield EU-ownedt 0.048** 2.04 0.042** 2.03 
Greenfield Other FOt 0.361** 2.21 0.306** 2.10 
Brownfield Other FOt -0.016 -0.54 -0.024 -0.93 
ln Industry agglomerationt -0.039** -2.18 -0.036** -2.26 
ln Diversificationt -0.146* -1.84 -0.185** -2.11 
ln Herfindahlt 0.025 0.97 0.021 0.87 
R&D undertakent -0.002 -0.13 0.001 0.08 
Located in Assisted Areat -0.025*** -3.58 -0.026*** -4.28 
North Eastt -0.029 -1.48 -0.043** -2.08 
Yorks-Humbersidet 0.060** 2.52 0.065*** 2.69 
North Westt 0.050*** 2.58 0.048*** 2.76 
West Midlandst -0.002 -0.25 -0.003 -0.35 
East Midlandst -0.011 -0.71 -0.010 -0.66 
South Westt 0.034*** 3.76 0.022*** 2.64 
Easternt -0.012 -0.71 -0.014 -0.93 
Londont -0.031** -2.08 -0.023* -1.81 
Scotlandt 0.088*** 4.11 0.077*** 4.57 
Walest 0.034** 2.10 0.022 1.54 
Tynesidet − − 0.075*** 3.48 
Manchestert − − 0.039 1.44 
Liverpoolt − − -0.051 -0.76 
Birminghamt − − 0.062*** 2.63 
Coventryt − − 0.076 1.45 
Leicestert − − -0.052* -1.67 
Nottinghamt − − 0.108** 2.52 
Bristolt − − 0.115** 1.97 
Glasgowt − − 0.102*** 3.64 
Edinburght − − -0.066** -2.06 
Cardifft − − 0.107*** 5.14 
     
Industry dummies yes  yes  
AR(1) z-statistic -3.84***  -3.88***  
AR(2) z-statistic 0.42  0.14  
Hansen test χ2 (df) 9.34 (6)  9.34 (6)  
No. of Obs. 14,218  14,218  
No. of groups 4,854  4,854  
a See Table 2 for definition 
 ***/**/* significant at 1%/5%/10% level.  
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Table A.4: Long-run weighted systems GMM production function, low-tech sectora, 1997-2006 
Dependent variable: ln gross outputt βˆ  z-statistic βˆ  z-statistic 
ln intermediate inputst 0.505*** 5.86 0.500*** 5.72 
ln employmentt 0.390*** 4.11 0.401*** 4.16 
ln capitalt 0.131*** 3.02 0.123*** 2.77 
t 0.023*** 6.15 0.023*** 6.09 
ln aget -0.158*** -6.13 -0.154*** -5.82 
Single-plant enterpriset 0.120*** 8.68 0.116*** 8.18 
Enterprise operates in >1 regiont 0.130*** 2.67 0.134*** 2.71 
Greenfield US-ownedt 0.112*** 4.45 0.117*** 4.61 
Brownfield US-ownedt 0.072* 1.69 0.077* 1.75 
Greenfield EU-ownedt 0.157** 2.48 0.165*** 2.56 
Brownfield EU-ownedt 0.197*** 3.16 0.203*** 3.18 
Greenfield Other FOt 0.009 0.16 0.016 0.27 
Brownfield Other FOt 0.022 0.62 0.026 0.72 
ln Industry agglomerationt -0.007 -0.26 -0.005 -0.19 
ln Diversificationt 0.077* 1.77 0.035 0.81 
ln Herfindahlt 0.032** 2.12 0.034** 2.23 
R&D undertakent -0.009 -0.10 0.006 0.07 
Located in Assisted Areat -0.050*** -4.21 -0.047*** -4.02 
North Eastt -0.057*** -3.12 -0.095*** -4.11 
Yorks-Humbersidet -0.140*** -2.87 -0.139*** -2.78 
North Westt -0.066** -2.04 -0.067*** -2.17 
West Midlandst -0.023 -1.28 -0.045*** -2.71 
East Midlandst -0.101*** -3.59 -0.105*** -3.92 
South Westt -0.006 -0.56 -0.005 -0.43 
Easternt -0.000 -0.04 -0.000 -0.03 
Londont 0.101*** 4.58 0.103*** 4.52 
Scotlandt 0.024 1.56 0.006 0.35 
Walest -0.051*** -3.47 -0.055*** -3.21 
Tynesidet − − 0.144*** 4.97 
Manchestert − − 0.075*** 3.52 
Liverpoolt − − -0.097** -2.41 
Birminghamt − − 0.099*** 4.75 
Coventryt − − 0.335*** 6.14 
Leicestert − − -0.061*** -2.86 
Nottinghamt − − 0.051 1.41 
Bristolt − − -0.040* -1.88 
Glasgowt − − 0.074*** 3.91 
Edinburght − − 0.105*** 4.78 
Cardifft − − -0.002 -0.06 
     
Industry dummies yes  yes  
AR(1) z-statistic -6.14***  -6.32***  
AR(2) z-statistic -1.16  -1.09  
Hansen test χ2 (df) 10.39 (6)  10.37 (6)  
No. of Obs. 24,096  24,096  
No. of groups 7,750  7,750  
a See Table 2 for definition  
***/**/* significant at 1%/5%/10% level.  
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Table A.5: Long-run weighted systems GMM production function, high-tech knowledge intensive 
sectora, 1997-2006 
Dependent variable: ln gross outputt βˆ  z-statistic βˆ  z-statistic 
ln intermediate inputst 0.413*** 4.42 0.420*** 4.52 
ln employmentt 0.467*** 6.44 0.466*** 6.53 
ln capitalt 0.062*** 4.27 0.060*** 4.10 
t 0.006** 2.40 0.006*** 2.57 
ln aget -0.175*** -8.38 -0.173*** -8.39 
Single-plant enterpriset 0.020 0.41 0.021 0.41 
Enterprise operates in >1 regiont -0.143* -1.65 -0.137 -1.60 
Greenfield US-ownedt 0.193*** 13.50 0.194*** 13.47 
Brownfield US-ownedt 0.359*** 10.05 0.356*** 9.95 
Greenfield EU-ownedt 0.179** 2.41 0.175*** 2.35 
Brownfield EU-ownedt 0.185*** 5.96 0.183*** 5.87 
Greenfield Other FOt 0.316*** 3.72 0.309*** 3.60 
Brownfield Other FOt -0.033** -2.65 -0.034*** -2.75 
ln Industry agglomerationt 0.060* 1.87 0.058* 1.77 
ln Diversificationt -0.174 -1.32 -0.167 -1.37 
ln Herfindahlt 0.093*** 5.40 0.092*** 5.39 
R&D undertakent 0.227** 2.51 0.225** 2.45 
Located in Assisted Areat -0.043*** -5.47 -0.030*** -3.93 
North Eastt -0.117*** -5.32 -0.169*** -6.48 
Yorks-Humbersidet -0.126*** -8.19 -0.127*** -7.33 
North Westt -0.102*** -6.05 -0.099*** -5.86 
West Midlandst -0.108*** -6.83 -0.112*** -6.42 
East Midlandst -0.137*** -6.30 -0.122*** -6.33 
South Westt -0.008 -0.82 -0.012 -1.32 
Easternt -0.021** -2.38 -0.021** -2.43 
Londont -0.007 -0.72 -0.007 -0.57 
Scotlandt -0.212*** -5.31 -0.218*** -5.97 
Walest -0.161*** -6.13 -0.143*** -7.57 
Tynesidet − − 0.143*** 5.41 
Manchestert − − 0.021 0.90 
Liverpoolt − − 0.031** 2.19 
Birminghamt − − 0.035** 2.27 
Coventryt − − 0.086*** 5.92 
Leicestert − − -0.170*** -8.03 
Nottinghamt − − 0.105*** 6.81 
Bristolt − − 0.030 1.15 
Glasgowt − − -0.037* -1.66 
Edinburght − − 0.045** 2.50 
Cardifft − − -0.090** -1.96 
     
Industry dummies yes  yes  
AR(1) z-statistic -4.99***  -4.96***  
AR(2) z-statistic -0.64  -0.77  
Hansen test χ2 (df) 7.32* (3)  7.41* (3)  
No. of Obs. 32,971  32,971  
No. of groups 12,696  12,696  
a See Table 2 for definition 
 ***/**/* significant at 1%/5%/10% level.  
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Table A.6: Long-run weighted systems GMM production function, knowledge-intensive market 
sectorsa, 1997-2006 
Dependent variable: ln gross outputt βˆ  z-statistic βˆ  z-statistic 
ln intermediate inputst 0.435*** 8.86 0.441*** 7.72 
ln employmentt 0.381*** 6.21 0.390*** 5.79 
ln capitalt 0.116*** 3.61 0.096*** 2.59 
t 0.004*** 2.98 0.005*** 3.10 
ln aget -0.061** -2.11 -0.042 -1.19 
Single-plant enterpriset 0.098*** 6.94 0.105*** 6.91 
Enterprise operates in >1 regiont 0.211*** 7.61 0.211*** 6.66 
Greenfield US-ownedt 0.118*** 2.84 0.094** 2.01 
Brownfield US-ownedt 0.040 1.48 0.044 1.45 
Greenfield EU-ownedt 0.160*** 2.93 0.159** 2.51 
Brownfield EU-ownedt 0.001 0.03 0.008 0.24 
Greenfield Other FOt 0.154** 2.22 0.174** 1.99 
Brownfield Other FOt 0.204*** 3.42 0.200*** 2.91 
ln Industry agglomerationt 0.068*** 7.49 0.068*** 6.96 
ln Diversificationt -0.123*** -4.32 -0.168*** -5.19 
ln Herfindahlt -0.013 -0.64 -0.007 -0.35 
R&D undertakent 0.180*** 3.32 0.120* 1.65 
Located in Assisted Areat -0.021*** -3.48 -0.035*** -5.26 
North Eastt -0.085*** -7.51 -0.144*** -9.35 
Yorks-Humbersidet -0.123*** -12.15 -0.111*** -8.59 
North Westt -0.083*** -10.73 -0.108*** -11.61 
West Midlandst -0.094*** -9.25 -0.106*** -8.32 
East Midlandst -0.109*** -8.91 -0.126*** -8.62 
South Westt -0.032*** -3.87 -0.027*** -2.58 
Easternt -0.017** -2.07 -0.016** -2.02 
Londont -0.005 -0.31 0.008 0.51 
Scotlandt -0.110*** -9.08 -0.083*** -5.65 
Walest -0.109*** -7.91 -0.120*** -6.90 
Tynesidet − − 0.158*** 6.26 
Manchestert − − 0.103*** 6.98 
Liverpoolt − − 0.119*** 5.59 
Birminghamt − − 0.058*** 3.96 
Coventryt − − 0.023 0.87 
Leicestert − − 0.124*** 4.85 
Nottinghamt − − 0.049*** 2.61 
Bristolt − − -0.019 -1.37 
Glasgowt − − 0.012 0.76 
Edinburght − − -0.087*** -5.34 
Cardifft − − 0.048*** 2.97 
     
Industry dummies yes  yes  
AR(1) z-statistic -4.18***  -4.15***  
AR(2) z-statistic 1.31  1.33  
Hansen test χ2 (df) 7.84 (6)  8.27 (6)  
No. of Obs. 27,995  27,995  
No. of groups 13,319  13,319  
a See Table 2 for definition 
 ***/**/* significant at 1%/5%/10% level.  
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Table A.7: Long-run weighted systems GMM production function, low knowledge-intensive market 
services sectora, 1997-2006 
Dependent variable: ln gross outputt βˆ  z-statistic βˆ  z-statistic 
ln intermediate inputst 0.810*** 20.67 0.821*** 19.95 
ln employmentt 0.170*** 2.97 0.159*** 2.71 
ln capitalt 0.043*** 2.90 0.043*** 2.92 
t -0.005*** -3.06 -0.004** -2.46 
ln aget -0.061*** -2.95 -0.062*** -3.00 
Single-plant enterpriset -0.015 -0.46 -0.023 -0.68 
Enterprise operates in >1 regiont -0.020 -0.47 -0.033 -0.73 
Greenfield US-ownedt -0.065*** -4.27 -0.071*** -4.37 
Brownfield US-ownedt -0.090*** -15.40 -0.092*** -16.28 
Greenfield EU-ownedt 0.063* 1.95 0.067** 2.04 
Brownfield EU-ownedt -0.035 -0.75 -0.050 -1.01 
Greenfield Other FOt -0.167* -1.87 -0.185** -2.00 
Brownfield Other FOt -0.114*** -2.68 -0.124*** -2.81 
ln Industry agglomerationt 0.006 1.33 0.003 0.58 
ln Diversificationt 0.043* 1.69 0.002 0.10 
ln Herfindahlt -0.100*** -30.15 -0.099*** -29.20 
R&D undertakent 0.181** 2.12 0.153* 1.75 
Located in Assisted Areat -0.015*** -7.08 -0.013*** -8.31 
North Eastt -0.043*** -13.71 -0.085*** -9.80 
Yorks-Humbersidet -0.102*** -31.75 -0.092*** -49.47 
North Westt -0.079*** -6.49 -0.089*** -6.73 
West Midlandst -0.039*** -6.66 -0.038*** -5.63 
East Midlandst -0.065*** -7.68 -0.077*** -6.97 
South Westt 0.015*** 4.91 -0.000 -0.10 
Easternt -0.024*** -4.91 -0.026*** -5.02 
Londont -0.008* -1.82 -0.001 -0.35 
Scotlandt -0.130*** -6.71 -0.144*** -6.40 
Walest -0.110*** -6.76 -0.109*** -5.75 
Tynesidet − − 0.135*** 4.43 
Manchestert − − 0.087*** 7.59 
Liverpoolt − − 0.005 0.81 
Birminghamt − − 0.001 0.09 
Coventryt − − 0.058*** 10.16 
Leicestert − − 0.067*** 6.40 
Nottinghamt − − 0.048*** 3.11 
Bristolt − − 0.137*** 7.72 
Glasgowt − − 0.055*** 12.08 
Edinburght − − 0.026* 1.82 
Cardifft − − -0.023** -2.29 
     
Industry dummies yes  yes  
AR(1) z-statistic -5.80***  -6.80***  
AR(2) z-statistic -1.60  -1.50  
Hansen test χ2 (df) 3.42 (3)  3.24 (3)  
No. of Obs. 351,721  351,721  
No. of groups 131,150  131,150  
a See Table 2 for definition.  
 ***/**/* significant at 1%/5%/10% level.  
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Table A.8: Long-run weighted systems GMM production function, other low knowledge-intensive 
services sectora, 1997-2006 
Dependent variable: ln gross outputt βˆ  z-statistic βˆ  z-statistic 
ln intermediate inputst 0.723*** 69.72 0.722*** 68.61 
ln employmentt 0.182*** 3.55 0.179*** 3.30 
ln capitalt 0.052*** 4.44 0.048*** 3.95 
t -0.001 -0.39 -0.000 -0.26 
ln aget -0.074*** -7.56 -0.070*** -6.88 
Single-plant enterpriset 0.416*** 7.78 0.425*** 7.60 
Enterprise operates in >1 regiont 0.378*** 13.92 0.378*** 13.40 
Greenfield US-ownedt 0.052 1.53 0.042 1.16 
Brownfield US-ownedt -0.152*** -14.45 -0.152*** -14.49 
Greenfield EU-ownedt 0.112** 2.16 0.113** 2.09 
Brownfield EU-ownedt 0.109** 2.37 0.117** 2.44 
Greenfield Other FOt -0.050 -0.81 -0.033 -0.52 
Brownfield Other FOt 0.153* 1.65 0.179* 1.80 
ln Industry agglomerationt 0.053*** 2.84 0.056*** 2.65 
ln Diversificationt -0.009 -0.31 -0.004 -0.14 
ln Herfindahlt 0.011*** 3.80 0.012*** 3.93 
R&D undertakent 0.422*** 5.37 0.447*** 5.58 
Located in Assisted Areat 0.043*** 10.66 0.049*** 10.47 
North Eastt -0.136*** -17.38 -0.086*** -5.95 
Yorks-Humbersidet -0.132*** -7.92 -0.138*** -6.89 
North Westt -0.062*** -5.08 -0.066*** -5.82 
West Midlandst -0.137*** -11.04 -0.130*** -13.85 
East Midlandst -0.051*** -5.67 -0.051*** -7.21 
South Westt -0.042*** -5.79 -0.042*** -6.11 
Easternt -0.049*** -14.10 -0.050*** -13.92 
Londont -0.012 -0.97 -0.015 -0.94 
Scotlandt -0.162*** -5.89 -0.194*** -6.58 
Walest -0.051*** -4.00 -0.047*** -3.53 
Tynesidet − − -0.179*** -10.72 
Manchestert − − 0.023* 1.81 
Liverpoolt − − -0.033 -1.05 
Birminghamt − − -0.066** -2.37 
Coventryt − − 0.066*** 6.67 
Leicestert − − -0.021 -1.13 
Nottinghamt − − 0.007 0.53 
Bristolt − − -0.021* -1.74 
Glasgowt − − 0.089*** 5.84 
Edinburght − − 0.064*** 9.06 
Cardifft − − -0.042*** -4.76 
     
Industry dummies yes  yes  
AR(1) z-statistic -5.88***  -5.73***  
AR(2) z-statistic -1.28  -1.18  
Hansen test χ2 (df) 2.42 (3)  2.30 (3)  
No. of Obs. 91,942  91,942  
No. of groups 32,975  32,975  
a See Table 2 for definition. 
 ***/**/* significant at 1%/5%/10% level.  
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